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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the inherent linkages between banks’ capital buffers and risk took center 
stage as policy makers promoted a more resilient global banking system. The growing recognition of Islamic banking as 
a viable alternative-banking model warrants the need to investigate the overall susceptibilities of Islamic banks’ capital 
buffers to unique risks emanating from their operating environments. We examine this issue over the period 2005-2012 
in the 18 countries where Islamic and conventional commercial banks coexist. We employ a panel model using dynamic 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) on a data set comprising 128 commercial banks of which 44 are Islamic 
commercial banks. The search for alternative forms of prudential regulation over and above risk based capital 
guidelines has also shifted the attention of policy makers towards investigating the disciplining effects of banks’ charter 
values on capital buffers. We test this issue for Islamic banks, and whether the relationship varies as a function of the 
size of the charter as implied by theory. We employ the cross-section threshold approach suggested by Hansen (2000) 
for 101 publicly listed commercial banks in the same countries. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first 
attempt to examine empirically the aforementioned issues for Islamic banks. This study is expected to expose 
shortcomings in capital adequacy guidelines and raises distinct policy implications with regards to the regulation and 
supervision of Islamic banks in countries where both bank types co-exist. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Motivation and main objectives  
With the advent of the recent financial crisis, the vulnerabilities of banks to adverse economic 
conditions were particularly exposed, as the consequential impairment of assets lead to losses and 
substantial capital depletion across the global banking system. In response to the crisis, 
governments were obligated to intervene through various programs including direct bank 
recapitalizations
1
 in an effort to stabilize the international financial system. This was imperative 
given the pivotal role of banks in the financial intermediation process thereby supporting overall 
global investment and economic growth. As an outcome of this, increased scrutiny of bank capital 
ratios synonymous with their levels of solvency, has prompted the Basel Committee on Banking 
                                                        
1 One such program is the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 in the United States, commonly referred to 
as a bailout of the U.S. financial system, and whereby the law enacted in response to the crisis authorizing the United 
States Treasury to spend up to USD700 billion to purchase distressed assets, and supply cash directly to banks. 
 
 
 
 
Supervision (BCBS) to propose new capital standards which would entail banks hold a higher 
quantity and quality of capital relative to requirements under the current Basel II rules.
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The prevalence of minimum capital requirements as a regulatory tool is based primarily on the 
assumption that banks are prone to engaging in excessive risk taking behaviour (Furlong and 
Keeley, 1989; Rochet, 1992). Effectively mitigating the problem of moral hazard via risk based 
capital standards is hampered however in the presence of a deposit insurance protection system 
which shields banks from the effects of market discipline. Along these lines for example, Merton 
(1977) demonstrates, in the presence of information asymmetries between banks and their 
depositors, any mispricing in deposit insurance costs give banks the incentive to decrease capital 
and increase asset risk at the detriment of other stakeholders. The incentives of bank managers to 
decrease capital and increase asset risk to the detriment of other stakeholders as depicted by moral 
hazard theory (Merton, 1977; Keeley, 1990), is however contested in practice. This is the case as 
banks maintain capital in excess of the regulatory minimum (capital buffers) in order to cushion 
potential negative shocks as they occur, and hence, reduce the costs associated with any regulatory 
violations (Milne and Whalley, 2001;Elizalde and Repullo, 2007). Capital buffer levels are 
therefore reflective of the risk profiles and outlooks of these financial institutions.  
The promotion of a more resilient banking sector in a challenging global environment has recently 
shifted the attention of policy makers and scholars towards Islamic banking as a potentially viable 
alternative-banking model (Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013; Beck et. al, 2013). 
Theoretically, the nature of transactions and investment activities of Islamic banks differ as 
compared to the lending activities of conventional banks. Having said that, supervisory and 
competitive pressures in the market place in jurisdictions where both bank types (Islamic and 
conventional) co-exist result in significant divergences in the current practices of Islamic banks 
from the theoretical models that were initially envisaged (Rosly, 1999; Archer et. al, 2010; Farook 
et, al, 2012). Unique risks for Islamic banks emanating from the nature of their activities as well as 
the aforementioned pressures in the market place range from the rate of return (ROR) risk and 
displaced commercial risk (DCR) emanating from balance sheet mismatches, to equity investment 
risk resulting from the profit and loss sharing (PLS) nature of their financing activities. 
In the banking literature, reasons associated with the presence of market discipline, market power, 
and adjustment costs amongst others have been suggested in order to justify why banks may hold 
capital above and beyond the minimum required levels (Keeley, 1990; Nier and Baumann, 2006; 
Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2010; Jokipii and Milne, 2011). Whilst a number of empirical studies have 
examined the determinants of capital buffers for conventional banks, to the best of our knowledge, 
comparable research for Islamic banks is lacking. In view of the above, our primary research 
question therefore comprises whether unique risk exposures emanating from their operating 
environments impact Islamic banks’ capital buffers and their resulting risk outlooks. 
We test this question using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) (i.e. the difference GMM) and the system-GMM estimator suggested by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) both for dynamic panel data. 
The search for alternative forms of prudential regulation over and above risk based capital 
guidelines has also motivated the theoretical literature in the field (Hellmann et. al, 2000; Blum, 
2002), with attention shifting particularly towards examining the influence of banks’ charter value3 
                                                        
 
2 Through the Basel III initiative, the BCBS has proposed a number of new capital, leverage, and liquidity standards to 
strengthen regulation, supervision, and risk management in the banking sector. 
 
 
3 The charter value is the net present value of future rents. As explained by Stolz (2007), the charter value would be lost 
 
 
 
 
on capital buffers (Keeley, 1990; Milne and Whalley, 2001;Elizalde and Repullo, 2007). Within the 
charter (franchise) value literature, Keeley (1990) for example brought forth the various 
anticompetitive restrictions that endowed banks with market power (monopoly rents) making 
banking charters valuable. Along these lines, and with reference to the works of Merton (1977), 
banks would therefore not have an incentive on the margin to increase default risk (through a 
reduction in the capital to assets ratio or an increase in asset risk) as long as the expected loss of 
charter value exceeds the gain to the bank from the enhanced value of the deposit insurance put 
option. Hellmann et al. (2000) and Elizalde and Repullo (2007) also examine the impact of 
competition on banks’ franchise values and economic capital. The capital buffer theory introduced 
by Milne and Whalley (2001) on the other hand offers a unique perspective in this field. This 
dynamic approach suggests two opposing forces can govern the relationship between banks’ charter 
values and their optimal capital buffers, namely a “charter value” effect and a “moral hazard” 
effect. Within this framework, one of these two regimes is expected to influence this relationship at 
any point in time, with the size of the charter acting as the regime-switching trigger. The 
implications of the capital buffer theory with regards to banks’ capital and risk adjustment decisions 
are therefore that the relationship between capital buffers and charter values is non-linear and a 
function of the size of the charter.  
 Empirical studies that examine the functional form of the relationship between charter (franchise) 
values and banks’ capital buffers, and whether in line with theory, are relatively scarce (Stolz, 2007; 
Jokipii, 2009)
4
. To the best of our knowledge, comparable research for Asian banks and Islamic 
banks in particular is also lacking. In view of the above, our second research question involves 
investigating whether Islamic banks' charter values have a disciplining effect on their risk-taking 
incentives (capital buffers) and whether this relationship is a function of the size of the charter (non-
linear) as implied by theory. We test this issue following the cross-section threshold approach 
suggested by Hansen (2000).  
1.2. Significance of the study 
This study is expected to make several contributions relative to the empirical literature in the field. 
First, it aims to fill the gap in the Islamic banking and finance literature by providing insight into 
the overall susceptibilities of Islamic banks’ capital buffers to unique risks emanating from their 
operating environments. Second, this study is expected to be the first to compare Islamic and 
conventional banks’ risk exposures in the 18 countries where both bank types co-exist. Third, in 
line with recent soundings for viable incentives that could moderate banks’ excessive risk taking 
behaviour, this study also examines the effects of banking market structures on the relationship 
between charter values and capital buffers for both bank types in the aforementioned countries. This 
in turn provides insight as to whether policy measures that promote competition contribute to the 
stability of the banking sector as a whole. In summary, we expect our findings to further enhance 
the risk management capabilities of Islamic banks, and in that sense, contribute to the resilience and 
sustainability of the Islamic financial system going forward. 
 
1.3. Organization 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
in the case of bankruptcy and, hence, represents banks' private cost of failure.  
4 It is also important to note that both Stolz (2007) and Jokipii (2009) determine the functional form of the relationship 
between charter values and capital buffers for European and US banks respectively using only spline estimation 
techniques.  
 
 
 
 
We proceed in the next section with a review of the theoretical and empirical literature associated 
with our research objectives. In section 3, we detail our main research questions, followed by a 
description of the proposed model specifications and estimation methods used in this study. In 
section 4, we present the descriptive statistics and report some of our empirical results. In section 5, 
we conclude with some final remarks. 
2. Literature review 
This section provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature associated with our 
stated research questions and hypotheses. In section 2.1, we begin our analysis by reviewing the 
theoretical underpinnings that form the basis of this study followed by a review of the empirical 
literature linked to the critical issues at hand for both conventional and Islamic banks.  
2.1. Theoretical underpinnings  
Theory suggests banks maintain capital in excess of the regulatory minimum (capital buffers) in 
order to cushion potential negative shocks as they occur and reduce the costs associated with any 
regulatory violations (Milne and Whalley, 2001;Elizalde and Repullo, 2007). In the banking 
literature, the influence of the cost of deposits on banks’ capital buffers is contingent on the strength 
of market discipline (Flannery, 1998; Gropp and Vesala, 2004; Nier and Baumann, 2006). Having 
said that, the generosity of deposit insurance schemes plays a prominent role in providing a moral 
hazard for excessive risk taking by banks (Merton, 1977; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; 
Cubillas et. al, 2012). Insured depositors consequently lose the incentive to monitor bank 
shareholders, as they demand a risk-free flat rate, regardless of the risk of deposits. This adversely 
impacts capital buffers due to the inherent linkages between capital decisions and banks’ risk 
choices. The ability of subordinated debt to enhance market discipline also seems to be contingent 
on whether a bank is able to credibly commit to a level of risk (Blum, 2002). In the event that a 
bank is unable to do this, correctly priced subordinated debt may in fact aggravate banks’ risk 
taking incentives.  
Within the charter (franchise) value literature, Keeley (1990) and Hellmann et al. (2000) also bring 
forth the various anti-competitive restrictions that endow banks with market power (monopoly 
rents) making banking charters valuable. Along these lines, banks are expected to reduce their risk 
taking incentives through higher capital buffers in order to preserve their valuable charters. Within 
this context, Hellmann et al. (2000) also demonstrates a negative relationship between the level of 
financial market liberalization and banks’ capital buffers. Milne and Whalley (2001) also offer a 
unique perspective in this area. In their dynamic model, banks hold capital buffers based on the 
trade-off of having to choose between the fixed cost of recapitalization in the event of violating 
minimum regulatory capital requirements and the potential loss of charter value when the 
supervisor discovers the violation. Milney and Whalley (2001) through the capital buffer theory 
demonstrate that when a bank is concerned with expected future earnings, and has a charter value 
that exceeds a certain threshold, the banks holds an optimal capital buffer above the regulatory 
minimum in order to cushion negative shocks and reduce the costs associated with regulatory 
violations. However, in the event that the charter value falls below the threshold, the bank is no 
longer concerned with future earnings and hence opts to paying out dividends at the highest rate 
possible ending in a liquidation if an audit takes place in line with static models of moral hazard. 
Based on the above, the theoretical predictions derived from the model developed by Milne and 
Whalley (2001) imply that the relationship between capital buffers and charter values in non-linear. 
 
 
 
 
And finally, discussions on the pro-cyclicality of banks’ behaviour on the other hand are widely 
prevalent in the economic literature and predict a negative relationship between capital levels and 
economic cycles. (Peek and Rosengren,1995;Bernanke and Lown,2001; Bliss and Kaufman,2002).  
The Islamic banking literature on the other hand, seems to indicate significant divergences between 
the current practices of Islamic banks and the theoretical models that were initially envisaged. Rosly 
(1999) for example illustrates a higher susceptibility to interest rate risk for Islamic banks relative to 
conventional banks. This is due to balance sheet mismatches resulting from an overall reliance on 
fixed profit rate (deferred payment sale) financing on the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet 
coupled with fluctuating returns to PSIA holders on the liability side. These disparities result in 
ROR risk and consequently DCR as balance sheet risks are shifted from PSIA holders to 
shareholders.  
A main determinant of the degree of exposure of Islamic banks to DCR is the risk characteristics of 
PSIAs that seem to vary from exhibiting deposit like to investment like features across jurisdictions 
in the presence of supervisory and competitive pressures in the market place (Archer and Abdel 
Karim, 2007). Farook et al. (2012) and Sudrarajan (2005) further explain that in contrast to the 
explicit contractual obligation to share profits with depositors, competitive pressures in the market 
place force implicit contractual conditions between Islamic banks and their depositors to provide 
distributions similar to market based deposit interest rates. The extent of profit distribution 
management towards market based interest rates (or away from asset returns) may in turn have a 
bearing on the risk outlook of the bank (Farook et al., 2012).  
From a capital guidelines perspective, Hall et al. (2000) demonstrate rising relative agency 
(monitoring) costs for an Islamic bank as a function of an increase in the level of the PSIAs in the 
capital structure. Within this context, given that capital adequacy ratios 
5
 ignore the agency roles 
performed by Islamic banks, Hall et al. (2000) suggest ratios should be governed by the traditional 
capital adequacy ratio if the Islamic bank is dominated by debt-based contracts (fiduciary role 
dominates). Otherwise, if the Islamic bank is dominated by unrestricted PSIAs (agency role 
dominates), shareholders should maintain capital buffers in order to enhance their supervisory and 
oversight mechanism. Archer el al. (2010) also suggest capital adequacy ratios are not based on 
well-developed and explicit methods for the estimation of DCR but rather subject to supervisory 
discretion.
6
 Along these lines, an inaccurate supervisory assessment by authorities might lead to 
Islamic banks being significantly undercapitalized, with consequent threats to financial stability, or 
conversely, might result in Islamic banks being required to carry excess amounts of capital, which 
will impair their ability to compete.  
And finally, drawing on modern capital structure theories, Al Deehani et al. (1999) provide a 
theoretical framework given the risk absorbent features of PSIAs, and whereby shareholders of 
Islamic banks are incentivized to keep their equity capital at a minimum and maximize PSIA 
financing in order to generate additional returns at no extra risk. On the firm level, Bacha (1997) 
also demonstrates greater incentives on a risk-adjusted basis for taking on leverage using 
Mudarabah based financing relative to debt financing given the inherent risk absorbent features of 
the former type of contract. Within the constraints of Shariah compliance, Toumi et al. (2012) also 
discuss the various contractual principles and social tenets in Islam, which in theory should lead to 
symmetry of information and enhanced transparency between the Islamic bank and its stakeholders 
as compared to conventional banks.  
                                                        
5 Hall et al. (2000) refer to the capital adequacy guidelines of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) in their paper. 
6 Archer et al. (2010) with reference to the capital guidelines of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) advocate a 
value-at-risk approach for the estimation of DCR rather than leaving it subject to supervisory discretion.  
 
 
 
 
In summary as indicated above, the theoretical underpinnings associated with the determinants of 
banks’ capital buffers, as well as the literature which encompasses unique risk exposures in the 
Islamic banking system, both seem to suggest a number of factors which might impact the capital 
buffers of Islamic banks. This in turn justifies the need for empirical answers with regards to the 
subject at hand. 
2.2. Review of empirical findings  
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) examine the influence of market discipline and market power on 
banks’ capital buffers using the difference GMM estimator for a sample of banks in 70 countries. In 
line with theoretical predictions, their findings suggest a positive influence for the cost of deposits, 
a proxy for market discipline, and the Lerner index, an indicator of market power in the banking 
sector, on banks’ capital buffers. Other empirical studies also provide evidence to suggest measures 
that reduce competition and increase bank franchise values are positively associated with capital 
buffers (Nier and Baumann, 2006; Uhde and Heimeshoff,2009; and Jokipii and Milne, 2011). On 
the other hand, whereas Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) indicate negative coefficients for non-
performing loans and loan loss provisions suggesting banks with greater asset riskiness have lower 
capital buffers, Jokipii and Milne (2011) and Shim (2012) amongst others indicate a positive 
relationship between loan loss provisions and capital buffers. A prevalence of studies also provides 
evidence to suggest banks’ capital buffers behave pro-cyclically in line with theory (Nier and 
Baumann, 2006; Tabak et al., 2011; Coffinet et al., 2012;Shim, 2012; Lee and Hseih, 2013). It is 
also important to indicate that a positive influence for adjustment costs on banks’ capital buffers is 
widely reported in the literature (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Stolz, 2007; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 
2010; Stolz and Wedow, 2011). The negative impact for the size effect on banks’ capital buffers, in 
line with the “too big to fail” paradigm of unconditional support by governments to large banks, is 
also reported in a number of empirical studies (Lindquist, 2003; Alfon et al., 2005; Stolz and 
Wedow, 2011). And finally, Boucinha (2008) also indicate a statistically significant positive 
relationship between banks’ stock weightings in their portfolios and capital buffers, and which 
suggests banks with higher exposure to market risk seem to hold larger capital buffers.  
Jokipii (2009) and Stolz (2007) on the other hand examine the long run relationship between capital 
buffers and charter values for sets of US and European Union (EU) banks respectively. Using a 
semi-parametric spline approach to allow the relationship between the two variables to vary 
depending on the size of the charter, the findings obtained by Jokipii (2009) suggest that the 
relationship between bank capital and charter values is nonlinear and concave in line with the 
capital buffer theory. It is important to note however that in contrast to theoretical predictions, 
Jokipii (2009) indicates that banks with charter values above the median level maintain a constant 
capital buffer and which he explains might be due to the better accessibility of large banks beyond a 
certain charter level to new equity thereby reducing the need for them to manage large capital 
buffers, or alternatively, might be associated with the “too big to fail” hypothesis. In contrast to the 
findings of Jokipii (2009), Stolz (2007) on the other hand finds the relationship is always found to 
be significant and negative for EU banks irrespective of the size of the charter, and hence rejecting 
the theoretical predictions of Milne and Whalley (2001). Stolz (2007) however points out that a 
negative relationship does not necessarily reject predictions of a nonlinear relationship if all banks 
in the sample have a charter value higher than their cost of recapitalization. This especially being 
the case given that the cost of recapitalization is difficult to observe, and therefore testing the effects 
of bank charter values on bank capital buffers are conducted without controlling for this variable. 
Recent Islamic banking studies (Beck et al., 2012; Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013) on the other hand 
suggest distinctions between Islamic and conventional banks are relatively scarce. On comparing 
their relative performances over the recent financial crisis, Beck et. al (2012) and Bourkhis and 
 
 
 
 
Nabi (2013) provide no evidence to suggest the crisis period affected the soundness of both bank 
types differently. The findings of Beck et. al (2012) however do suggest higher asset quality and 
equity to asset ratios for Islamic relative to conventional banks during local banking crises. This 
might indicate that they are less likely to dis-intermediate and deleverage relative to conventional 
banks. Cihak and Hesse (2008) also provide evidence to suggest comparatively higher stability for 
small Islamic banks relative to large Islamic banks. Interestingly, the findings obtained by Hasan 
and Dridi (2010) suggest otherwise as they report large Islamic banks fared better than both large 
conventional banks and small Islamic banks during the recent crisis period. On a similar note, 
Farook et al. (2012) also investigate the factors affecting the extent to which Islamic banks manage 
their profit distributions towards market based interest rates (or away from asset returns). This as a 
consequence has implications on the Islamic banks’ financial stability and reporting incentives. The 
results obtained by Farook et al. (2012) seem to suggest a significant positive relationship between 
the extent of profit distribution management and the exposure of Islamic banks to fixed rate 
financing and the ensuing profit rate risk that occurs. This lends support to the discussions of Rosly 
(1999). 
In summary, the aforementioned empirical studies are conflicting in their results possibly as a 
consequence of the relevant methodologies and time periods used. Where as a number of empirical 
studies have examined the determinants of banks’ capital buffers in the conventional banking 
system, to the best of our knowledge, comparable research for the Islamic banking sector is 
currently lacking. There is therefore a need for empirical tests corresponding to our main research 
questions and hypotheses with the help of appropriate methodologies brought forward in the next 
section. Our tests are henceforth designed to fill this void in the Islamic banking literature in 
particular.  
3. Proposed methodology (questions, models and methods) 
This section details our main research objectives, followed by a description of the proposed model 
specifications and estimation methods for each of the research questions in sections 3.2 and 3.3 
consequently. 
3.1. Critical questions and hypotheses 
Theoretical discussions brought forward in the literature review suggest supervisory and 
competitive pressures in the market place in jurisdictions where both bank types (Islamic and 
conventional banks) co-exist expose Islamic banks to unique risks emanating from their current 
practices. As discussed earlier, ensuing risks for Islamic banks include the rate of return (ROR) risk 
and displaced commercial risk (DCR) emanating from balance sheet mismatches. Other unique 
risks include equity investment risk resulting from the profit and loss sharing (PLS) nature of 
Islamic banks’ financing activities.7 
The risk absorbent features of Mudarabah-based PSIAs suggest that shocks to assets financed by 
these accounts should be passed on to PSIA holders and hence not impact the banks’ own capital. 
Having said that, in practice the characteristics of PSIAs vary from being deposit-like in some 
jurisdictions, which would indicate the presence of DCR, to investment-like in other jurisdictions, 
which would indicate no DCR. Archer el al. (2010) for example discuss the potentially detrimental 
effects on capital adequacy ratios (CARs) emanating from the lack of well-developed and explicit 
methods for the estimation of DCR by supervisors. This in turn might impact Islamic banks either 
                                                        
7 Other risks also emanate from the lack of Shariah compliant risk hedging and liquidity instruments in the various 
jurisdictions as well as Shariah compliance risk.  
 
 
 
 
by making them significantly undercapitalized, with consequent threats to financial stability, or 
conversely, might result in Islamic banks being required to carry excess amounts of capital, which 
will impair their ability to compete.  
Hall et al. (2000) on the other hand theoretically demonstrate rising relative agency (monitoring) 
costs for an Islamic bank as a function of an increase in the level of the PSIAs in the capital 
structure. And hence, due to shortcomings in current capital adequacy guidelines for Islamic banks, 
Hall et al. (2000) suggest a minimum level of financial participation (capital buffers) by the 
shareholders of a bank would serve to reduce moral hazard. This is the case given that absolute risk 
aversion is a function of the net asset value of the bank, and the level of unrestricted PSIAs in the 
capital structure is negatively related with the level of shareholders’ risk aversion. And finally, 
drawing on modern capital structure theory, Al Deehani et al. (1999) demonstrate that subject to the 
risk absorbent features of PSIAs, shareholders are incentivized to keep their equity capital at a 
minimum and maximize PSIA financing in order to generate additional returns at no extra risk. As 
mentioned earlier, however, this does not seem to be a plausible assumption in practice. 
In view of the above, the argument put forth by Archer et al. (2010) would seem to suggest Islamic 
banks’ management might potentially adjust their own capital buffers in an effort to more 
accurately reflect their own in-house perspectives and risk outlooks, and hence, internally specify 
the adequate amount of additional capital required in order to mitigate DCR. The theoretical 
arguments proposed by Hall et al. (2000) on the other hand would seem to suggest that capital 
buffers are positively related to the level of unrestricted PSIAs in the capital structure of an Islamic 
bank given that AAOIFI capital adequacy guidelines ignore the agency role performed by Islamic 
banks. Having said that, whilst the theoretical predictions demonstrated by Al Deehani et al. (1999) 
suggest a negative relationship between capital buffers and the level of unrestricted PSIAs in the 
capital structure of an Islamic bank, their underlying assumptions do not seem to hold in practice.   
Along similar lines, Farook et al. (2012) also suggest the degree to which Islamic banks undertake 
to provide distributions to PSIAs similar to market based deposit interest rates may have a bearing 
on the risk outlook of the bank. Within this context, banks that engage (do not engage) in profit 
distribution management, may be taking on more (less) equity risk and thereby shielding (exposing) 
investment depositors of the risks associated with the asset portfolios of the banks. This in turn 
entices banks’ management to have a more cautious (aggressive) risk profile to ensure (because) 
shareholders’ equity is not threatened. Drawing on the theoretical discussions proposed by Farook 
et al. (2012), it can therefore be implied that capital buffers are positively related to the level of 
profit distribution management towards market based interest rates (or away from asset returns)
8
. 
Risks emanating from an overall reliance on fixed profit rate (deferred payment sale) financing on 
the asset side (Rosly, 1999), also serve to exacerbate the balance sheet mismatches and resulting 
exposures of Islamic banks to ROR and DCR. And hence, in line with the above, Islamic banks are 
encouraged to adopt a more cautious risk profile (higher capital buffers) in order to mitigate these 
risks. Having said that, the impact of participatory (PLS based) financing and the ensuing equity 
investment risk on Islamic banks’ capital buffers remain unclear. Whereas Toumi et al. (2012) seem 
to suggest reduced problems of moral hazard and information asymmetries between the parties as 
Islamic banks have more effective means to control and minimize the risk of loss of capital, Bacha 
(1997) on the other hand seems to suggest much higher agency problems associated with 
Mudarabah financing relative to conventional equity and debt financing. 
In view of the aforementioned theoretical discussions our first critical question is therefore:  
 
Q.1: Do unique risk exposures in the Islamic banking system impact Islamic banks’ capital buffers 
and hence their resulting risk outlooks? 
                                                        
8  The level of profit distribution management is also linked to the practice of income smoothing by Islamic banks for 
unrestricted PSIAs that is prevalent in the literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
This in turn would entail examining the impact of the levels of PSIAs, the levels of profit 
distribution management towards market based interest rates (or away from asset returns), the levels 
of PLS based financing and the levels of fixed rate financing on the capital buffers of Islamic banks. 
In response to the critical question on hand for Islamic banks, and drawing on the aforementioned 
theoretical discussions we expect the following outcomes: 
 
Expected outcomes in light of the theoretical predictions for Islamic banks 
The level of Islamic banks' capital buffers are positively related to the level of unrestricted 
PSIAs in the capital structure 
The level of Islamic banks' capital buffers are positively related to the level of profit 
distribution management towards market based interest rates  
The level of Islamic banks' capital buffers are positively related to the level of fixed rate 
financing in their investment portfolio 
The relationship between Islamic banks' capital buffers and the level of equity (PLS based) 
financing in the investment portfolio is indeterminate 
 
The theoretical literature also predicts a moderating effect of banks’ charter values that is reflective 
of their market power (monopoly rents), on banks’ risk taking incentives as mirrored in their capital 
buffers (Keeley, 1990). The underlying notion being banks with high charter values 
characteristically have a lower probability of default as represented by higher capital (buffers), and 
also tend to exhibit lower asset risk in their portfolios (Stolz, 2007), all in a bid to protect their 
valuable charters. On analysing the determinants of economic capital, the theoretical model 
developed by Elizalde and Repullo (2007) also demonstrate that changes in the market power of 
banks may impact economic capital differently depending on the initial level of competition. 
Elizalde and Repullo (2007) demonstrate that the threat of closing undercapitalized banks induces 
bank shareholders to choose a capital level above regulatory capital, and hence such regulations 
typically explain why banks hold capital buffers above the regulatory minimum. The “charter value 
hypotheses” model based on the works of Allen and Gale (2004) and developed in order to examine 
the relationship between banking stability and the degree of competition, also predicts banks’ risk 
of failure as increasing with the number of competing firms. 
Drawing on capital buffer theory, Milne and Whalley (2001) develop a theoretical model in order to 
explain why banks hold capital buffers in excess of the regulatory minimum. Through their model, 
they demonstrate two opposing effects that govern the relationship between charter values and 
capital buffers, namely the “charter value effect” and the “moral hazard effect”. As explained by 
Jokipii (2009), the former effect, which suggests a negative relationship, dominates when a bank is 
concerned with expected future earnings, and has a charter value that exceeds a certain threshold. 
And hence, when the expected loss from the charter value outweighs the benefits from deposit 
insurance schemes (financial safety nets), the banks hold an optimal capital buffer above the 
regulatory minimum in order to cushion negative shocks and reduce the costs associated with 
violating the regulatory minimum. Within this context, high charter value banks are therefore 
motivated to hold larger capital buffers as the charter value falls in order to protect the valuable 
charter. As the charter value falls below the threshold, however, the “moral hazard effect” 
dominates as the bank is no longer concerned with future earnings and hence opts to paying out 
dividends at the highest rate possible ultimately ending in a liquidation if an audit takes place in line 
with static models of moral hazard. In the latter case, the relationship is reversed as the incentive to 
protect the charter value is eroded, and the bank is no longer concerned with future earnings as the 
optimal capital buffer falls to zero. In summary based on the above, the theoretical predictions 
 
 
 
 
derived from the model developed by Milne and Whalley (2001) seem to imply that the relationship 
between capital buffers and charter values in non-linear and a function of the size of the charter.  
From a theoretical standpoint therefore, the relationship between Islamic banks’ capital buffers and 
their charter values remain inconclusive. Along these lines, we therefore proceed to test whether 
Islamic banks' charter values have a disciplining effect on their risk taking incentives (capital 
buffers), and whether this relationship is a function of the size of the charter as predicted by theory. 
Our second critical question is therefore:  
 
Q.2: Is the relationship between Islamic banks’ capital buffers and their charter values non-linear as 
predicted by theory? 
 
In response to the critical question on hand for Islamic banks, and drawing on the above-mentioned 
theoretical discussions we expect the following outcomes as a function of the size of the banks’ 
charter: 
 
Expected outcomes in light of the theoretical predictions for Islamic banks 
In a high charter value environment, a negative relationship dominates between Islamic 
banks’ capital buffers and their charter values as banks seek to protect their valuable charter 
In a low charter value environment, a positive relationship dominates between Islamic banks’ 
capital buffers and their charter values as the incentive to protect the charter is eroded 
3.2. The determinants of Islamic banks’ capital buffers 
3.2.1. Model specification 
With reference to our first critical question as earlier stated, we propose the following empirical 
model: 
 
                                                                          
                                                         ∑        
 
    
   ∑   
    
               
 
where   indicates the bank (  = 1,…, 128) and   indicates the annual time period (  = 2005,…, 
2012). 
 
We measure capital buffers           in relative terms, i.e., the difference between the total capital 
ratio and the minimum regulatory capital requirement divided by this requirement 
9
 (see Fonseca 
and Gonzalez, 2010). The influence of adjustment costs on the banks’ optimal capital ratios are 
captured by the first lag of the dependent variable            . 
We capture the extent of banks’ profit distribution management (      ) via two measures, namely 
the asset spread               and the equity spread              (see Farook et al., 2012). The 
first bank specific measure, the asset spread               represents the absolute spread between 
                                                        
9 It is important to note however that the regulatory requirements placed on banks have undergone changes throughout 
the sample period associated with the varying timelines for the implementation of the Basel I and II capital adequacy 
guidelines by the regulators in each jurisdiction in our sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
the return on assets (ROA) (after considering all expenses but excluding profits paid to depositors) 
and the returns on depositors’ funds.10 Within this context, a larger asset spread indicates a greater 
extent of profit distribution management towards market based interest rates (or away from asset 
returns). As indicated by Farook et al. (2012), the asset spread is potentially the most relevant 
measure of the extent of profit distribution management given that it captures the spread between 
total asset return on the banks’ asset and services portfolio and the distributions paid to depositors. 
In order to ensure consistency with the asset spread, the second measure, namely the equity spread 
            , represents the absolute spread between the average return on equity and the average 
rate of return on depositors’ funds. Given the reliance of Islamic banks on UPSIAs as a funding 
source 
11
 (see Sundararajan, 2008), we include the level of unrestricted UPSIAs relative to total 
liabilities           to examine its impact on Islamic banks’ capital buffers.
12 
  
We attempt to capture the impact of equity investment risk emanating from the profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) nature of Islamic banks’ financing activities on capital buffers by including the level 
of PLS based financing relative to total financing             . Given an overall reliance on fixed 
profit rate (deferred payment sale) financing on the asset side (Rosly, 1999), we also include an 
additional variable which represents the level of fixed rate financing relative to total financing 
                 
We include bank specific control variables         ) and which consist namely of return on equity 
        , non performing loans (      )  loan loss provisions         , loans relative to customer 
deposits             , and a proxy for the influence of bank size           (see Shrieves and 
Dahl, 1992; Nier and Baumann, 2006; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2010; Beck et al., 2012).  
Our country specific control variables include a measure of the market structure, namely the degree 
of market concentration within an industry        , by considering the three-bank          and 
four-bank         concentration ratios (see Lee and Hsieh, 2013). Computation of the above 
measures involves determining the total assets of the top three and four banks respectively relative 
to total banking assets in each country. Given that the developing countries in our sample have been 
engaged in a process of deregulation, bank privatization and financial liberalization, we include a 
measure that examines the degree of financial development (         ), namely the financial 
development index. The composition and scoring of this index is a function of an assessment of 
seven indicators grouped into three categories that gage the various aspects of financial 
development, namely: factors, policies and institutions; financial intermediaries; and financial 
access. The World Economic Forum provides an overall score for each country on a 1 to 7 
normalized scale. In line with widely prevalent theoretical discussions in the economic literature on 
the pro-cyclicality of bank capital, we also include the annual growth of real gross domestic product 
           and the annual growth of real per capita gross domestic product              .  
We include two variables on financial market regulations            , namely a measure for 
supervisory power          and a measure for market discipline and private monitoring           
(see Lee and Hsieh, 2013). The supervisory power measure gauges the authority of supervisory 
                                                        
10 Within this context, it is important to note that based on the nature of the contractual arrangements between Islamic 
banks and their customers, not all depositors’ accounts are entitled to profits. 
11 The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) does not permit such accounts in the capital structure of Islamic 
banks, and hence, similar tenured Shariah compliant deposits are used instead.  
12  For comparison purposes, and given the market perception of unrestricted PSIAs by retail customers as close 
substitutes for conventional deposits, we have also included the level of similar tenured deposits relative to total 
liabilities for conventional banks. 
 
 
 
 
agencies in each country, indicating the extent to which they can take specific actions against bank 
management and directors, shareholders, and bank auditors. This index takes values between 0 and 
14 with higher values indicating more supervisory power. Our measure for market discipline and 
private monitoring uses an index to indicate the level of market discipline and shows the degree to 
which banks are forced to disclose accurate information to the public and whether there are 
incentives to increase market discipline. In line with Lee and Hsieh (2013), this index ranges 
between 0 and 8 with higher values indicating greater market discipline. Both indices are 
determined based on the regulatory and supervisory database questionnaires provided by the World 
Bank. 
We include an Islamic bank dummy        , which takes the value of one for Islamic banks and 
zero otherwise. We interact the Islamic bank dummy with the other variables in our study through 
several specifications to compare Islamic and conventional banks in relation to the critical issues at 
hand. We include a dummy variable for explicit deposit insurance schemes           . We also 
include dummy variables for publicly listed banks          and state owned banks        . We 
in turn interact these dummy variables with the Islamic bank dummy as well as other variables at 
hand in order to examine these specifications in relation to the critical issues at hand. 
The scarcity of Islamic banks when compared on a country-by-country basis indicates it is best we 
include a set of regional dummy variables           as opposed to country dummy variables in 
order to control for other region specific characteristics not included above. We in turn include 
dummies to represent the following regions, namely the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey 
(MENAT) region, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, and the South 
Asian (SOUTHASIA) region.  
We also introduce time fixed effects, through the inclusion of time dummies    ) in order to 
account for any cross sectional dependence in the data. Controlling for this allows us to examine the 
robustness of our results to the inclusion of time fixed effects. Within this context, in line with Beck 
et al. (2013), we also check the robustness of our main results by interacting the Islamic bank 
dummy         with a crisis dummy (CRISIS), and which takes on the value one for the financial 
crisis period in 2008. Given the limitations associated with the relatively short time period covered 
in our panel data set, we do not include a time trend component. Having said that, it is important to 
note that Nier and Baumann (2006) suggest a tighter control is to introduce time fixed effects as we 
have done.  
And finally,    is an unobservable bank-specific effect assumed to be constant over time; and     is 
the white noise error term. 
Please note a table that summarizes the aforementioned variables along with definitions, 
descriptions and data sources is included in Appendix B. 
3.2.2. Estimation method 
The theoretical literature investigating banks’ capital buffers makes use of dynamic models in order 
to control for adjustment costs that banks may face in moving towards their optimal capital ratios 
(Milne and Whalley, 2001; Elizalde and Repullo, 2007). Dynamic panel data regressions are 
characterized by two sources of persistence over time, namely, autocorrelation due to the presence 
of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors and individual effects characterizing the 
heterogeneity among the individuals.  
The endogeneity problem associated with dynamic models is dealt with in this study using the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) which is 
 
 
 
 
more efficient than the instrumental variable (IV) estimation procedure suggested by Anderson and 
Hsiao (1981). Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrate additional instruments can be obtained in a 
dynamic panel data model if one utilizes the orthogonality conditions that exist between lagged 
values of the dependent variable and the disturbances    . Using these moment conditions, Arellano 
and Bond (1991) propose a two-step GMM estimator. In the first step, the error terms are assumed 
to be both independent and homoskedastic across entities and over time. In the second step, the 
residuals obtained in the first step are used to construct a consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumptions of independence and homoskedasticity. The 
estimator based on these conditions is referred to as the difference GMM estimator.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate however that the instruments used in the difference GMM 
estimator become less informative in two important cases. Firstly, as the autoregressive parameter 
increases toward unity; and second as the variance of the parameter effect increases relative to the 
variance of the transitory shocks. In response to the shortcomings of the difference GMM estimator, 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) propose that an additional mild 
stationarity restriction on the initial conditions process allows the use of an extended system GMM 
estimator that uses lagged differences of the dependent variable as instruments for equations in 
levels, in addition to lagged levels of the dependent variable as instruments for equations in first 
differences. The system GMM estimation is found to be more appropriate than the difference GMM 
estimation in the presence of variables that are close to a random walk (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 
2009), given that the latter estimation under these conditions is found to suffer from a weak 
instrument problem (Sarafidis et. al, 2009). Whilst the flexible GMM framework accommodates 
unbalanced panels, another disadvantage of the difference GMM approach is that it magnifies gaps 
in unbalanced panels (Roodman, 2009). This in turn motivates the use of forward orthogonal 
deviations transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995).
13
 
In view of the above, we run both the two-step difference and system GMM estimations for our 
panel data set (see tables in the Appendix). We follow up with post estimation specification tests, 
namely the Sargan (1975) test for over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond (1991) test 
for no autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. We base our decision to proceed with the 
difference GMM estimation in spite of the limitations discussed above, given the relatively low 
level of persistence in the time series dimension of capital buffers (average of around 0.34), and for 
which high persistence in the series is a necessary condition for expectations of asymptotic 
efficiency gains using the system GMM
14
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2009). On 
comparing across specifications, the application of difference GMM is also warranted given the 
estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable for the two-step system estimator does not 
increase significantly on average relative to the two-step differenced estimator
15
 (Windmeijer, 
2005). We apply the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to the reported standard errors in 
the two-step estimation, without which estimations of the standard errors tend to be severely 
downward biased. It is important to note the distribution of the Sargan test is not known after 
specifying Windmeijer corrected (WC-robust) standard errors. Specifying WC-robust standard 
errors also produces variance-covariance estimates that are robust to heteroskedasticity. With 
regards to the instrument proliferation problem, we do not follow the rule of thumb recommended 
                                                        
13  The forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) transformation option is available in David Roodman’s xtabond2 
implementation of the dynamic panel data estimator.  
14  Roodman (2009) as a rule of thumb, suggests an estimated coefficient of at least 0.8 is required to indicate 
persistence in the series, and for which system GMM results based on simulations seem the most promising. 
15 Windmeijer (2005) suggests an increase in the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable for the two-
step system GMM estimator of at least 50% relative to the estimated coefficient of the two-step differenced estimator as 
evidence that the former estimator corrects the downward bias through the use of a more informative set of instruments. 
 
 
 
 
 
by Roodman (2009), and which suggests collapsing the instrument matrix.
16
 It is however relevant 
to note the length of our time series on average across the panel is relatively short, and hence the 
number of instruments doesn’t outnumber the individual units (number of groups). This suggests 
potential problems of instrument proliferation are not apparent (Roodman, 2009). Roodman (2009) 
also indicates issues associated with instrument proliferation are particularly suspect in system 
GMM estimations as a large instrument collection over-fits endogenous variables even as it 
weakens the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. The possibility of instrument 
proliferation therefore also warrants the application of difference GMM. 
We check the robustness of our empirical results by considering modifications to our empirical 
model as applied to both the full and subsamples of banks respectively. Given that GMM estimators 
assume that the disturbances of error terms are cross-sectionally independent, we introduce time 
fixed effects (time dummies) to account for any cross sectional dependence in the data. The 
inclusion of time dummies or demeaning data is sufficient as a control if homogenous cross 
sectional dependence is present, however, there can be still cross-sectional dependence in the error 
terms which is the case under heterogeneous error cross-sectional dependence (Sarafidis and 
Robertson, 2009).
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3.3. Threshold analysis of banks’ capital buffers 
3.3.1. Model specification 
In relation to the second critical question at hand, we use the threshold regression approach 
suggested by Hansen (2000) to examine the nonlinear behaviour of charter values in relation to 
banks’ capital buffers as a function of the size of the charter as suggested by theory. The model, 
based on threshold regression, takes the following form: 
 
                                                  
 
Where as discussed earlier, we measure capital buffers         in relative terms, i.e., the 
difference between the total capital ratio and the minimum capital requirement divided by the 
minimum capital requirement. We proxy the charter value of the bank       through two variables 
common to the literature, firstly, Tobin’s q ratio         which is defined as the current market 
value of a firm's assets (the market value of its equity plus debt) divided by their current cost to a 
firm (the book value of assets) (Keeley, 1990; Saurina, 1997). As discussed by Keeley (1990), 
Tobin’s q ratio is an ideal measure of market power given that the capitalized value of monopoly 
rents whether arising from dominance in the asset markets, or the deposit markets, or both, would 
be reflected in the firm’s equity market value, and hence in their assets, without being reflected in 
the costs of the acquired assets. As suggested by Furlong and Kwan (2005), we also employ the 
market value to book value of capital         as a proxy for a bank’s charter value, given that in 
line with Tobin’s q ratio, the present value of a firm’s future rents would also be reflected in this 
measure. 
                                                        
16 It is important to note that this feature is not available in Stata’s official commands (xtabond) but is however an 
additional feature in David Roodman’s (2009) xtabond2.  
17 Testing procedures for error cross sectional dependence are not available in Stata’s official commands (xtabond) but 
are however an additional feature in David Roodman’s (2009) xtabond2.  
 
 
 
 
 
Given that the capital buffer theory, seems to imply that the relationship between capital buffers and 
charter values in non-linear and a function of the size of the charter, the charter value of the bank 
     is the threshold variable used to split the sample into regimes or groups and   is the unknown 
threshold parameter.
18
 I(�) is the indicator function, which takes the value 1 if the argument in the 
indicator function is valid, and 0 otherwise. This type of modelling in turn allows the relationship 
between charter values and banks’ capital buffers to differ depending on whether the size of the 
charter is below/equal to or above some unknown level of  . In this equation, our proxies for the 
size of the charter      therefore act as the sample-splitting (or threshold) variables. The impact of 
banks’ charter values on capital buffers will therefore be a function of the size of the charter, 
defined by    and    for banks with low or high charter value regimes, respectively.  
Within this context, it is important to note that Hansen (2000) allows for the threshold variable to be 
an element of the m-vector of explanatory variables. This is particularly relevant given that as noted 
earlier, the charter value of the bank      acts as both the threshold variable and the explanatory 
variable of interest,    , in the empirical model.   
   on the other hand is a vector of bank and country specific control variables namely consisting of, 
the level of non-performing loans relative to total financing        as a measure of bank risk, the 
degree of financial development (       ) as reflected by the financial development index 
provided by the World Economic Forum, and the annual growth of real gross domestic product 
        . All the variables are transformed into logarithm. And finally    is the white noise error 
term.  
Please note a table that summarizes the aforementioned variables along with definitions, 
descriptions and data sources is included in Appendix B. 
3.3.2. Estimation method 
As discussed earlier, the implications based on theory (Milne and Whalley, 2001; Elizalde and 
Repullo, 2007) are that the relationship between capital buffers and charter values is non-linear and 
a function of the size of the charter. For the purposes of this study therefore, we follow the Hansen 
(2000) approach for estimating TAR models
19
, given that the threshold in this case is governed by 
the size of the charter that is acting as the regime-switching trigger, taking on a value below/equal 
to (or above) some value  20, and hence an observable process determines the regime. As implied 
by theory (Milne and Whalley, 2001), the transition in the level of the variable being modelled 
      is also assumed to be abrupt, and based on some exogenously determined value of this 
variable in line with the specifications of the TAR model. Having said that, we do not pursue the 
panel threshold approach suggested by Hansen (1999) given that an important limitation of this 
model is that all regressors are required to be strictly exogenous, and we recognize the possibility 
for potential endogeneity between banks’ charter values and capital buffers, since banks will try to 
maintain a target probability of default as a function of both capital levels and asset risk, and which 
in turn is linked to the value of the charter. Along these lines, it is also important to note that the 
theory for the case of dynamic panel thresholds has not been developed as of yet. From a theoretical 
                                                        
18 Using spline estimation techniques both Stolz (2007) and Jokipii (2009) also split their sample size based on charter 
values. This is in line with the theoretical predictions of the capital buffer theory whereby the model developed by 
Milne and Whalley (2001) seems to imply that the relationship between capital buffers and charter values in non-linear 
and a function of the size of the charter. 
19 Initially proposed by Tong (1978). 
20 The empirical model is defined in the previous section. 
 
 
 
 
standpoint, a number of papers analyse capital and risk taking decisions where banks’ franchise 
values are endogenous (Elizalde and Repullo, 2007; Souarez, 1994). We therefore proceed by 
following the cross-section threshold approach suggested by Hansen (2000), given the limitations 
associated with obtaining time series data for publicly listed banks in the jurisdictions under study 
(as indicated in section 3.4).
21
 It is also relevant to point out that the data set employed in this 
analysis includes the full sample of publicly-listed conventional and Islamic commercial banks in 
the jurisdictions where both Islamic and conventional banking systems coexist. Within this context, 
our empirical results extend to both bank types. Repeating the analysis on a sample consisting 
exclusively of Islamic commercial banks is not possible at this stage given the limited number of 
publicly listed Islamic commercial banks, and whereby of the final data set consisting of 101 
publicly listed commercial banks only 25 are Islamic commercial banks.
22
 Having said that, we 
examine however whether our empirical findings for the full sample apply to Islamic banks as well 
based on the relative distributions of the Islamic banks’ threshold values around the identified 
threshold value point estimates.  
Based on Hansen (2000) therefore, we explore the nonlinear behavior of banks’ charter values in 
relation to capital buffers subject to the threshold regression model illustrated below (and further 
defined in section 3.3.1): 
 
                                                  
 
As indicated above,   , which represents the size of the banks’ charter value, is the threshold 
variable used to split the data set into regimes or sub-samples, and   is the unknown threshold 
parameter.     on the other hand is the indicator function which takes the value of 1 if the 
argument is valid and 0 otherwise. This in turn allows the role of banks’ charter values     to differ 
depending on whether the size of the charter falls below/equal to or above some unknown level of 
 . As mentioned earlier, the size of the charter is therefore acting as the sample-splitting or regime-
switching trigger.   
As suggested by Hansen (2000), we begin by testing the null hypothesis of linearity          in 
order to verify that there is indeed evidence for a threshold effect, and given that the impact of 
banks’ charter values on capital buffers will be   and    in a low and high charter value 
environments respectively. This in turn, is done by employing the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for a threshold as suggested by Hansen (1996). Since the threshold 
parameter   was not identified under the null hypothesis of no threshold effect, this becomes a non-
standard inference problem and the Wald or LM test statistics therefore do not carry their 
conventional chi-square limits (Hansen, 1996, 2000). Inferences are obtained instead through p-
values computed by a bootstrap analog, fixing the regressors from the right-hand side of the 
equation, and generating the bootstrap dependent variable from the distribution       ̂ 
   where 
 ̂ is the OLS residual from the estimated threshold model. This bootstrap analog produces 
asymptotically correct p-values as established by Hansen (1996). 
Following Hansen (2000), the statistical significance of the threshold estimate is therefore 
determined via the p-value subject to 1000 bootstrap replications and a 15% trimming percentage. 
Once an estimate of   is obtained (as the minimizer of the residual sum of squares computed across 
all possible values of  ), estimates of the slope parameters follow trivially as  ̂̂( ̂) and  ̂( ̂).  
                                                        
 
21 The approach developed by Hansen (2000) allows for either cross-section or time series observations. 
22 Within this context, it is important to note that in jurisdictions such as Malaysia most Islamic banks are subsidiaries 
of conventional banks, and hence, the Islamic banking subsidiaries are not individually listed on the public exchanges. 
 
 
 
 
Following this, it is also important to note that the presence of an endogeneity problem would imply 
that the least squares (LS) estimation may yield biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates, and 
hence, hypotheses tests can be seriously misleading. We therefore test for the potential endogeneity 
of the charter value by performing the Durban-Wu-Hausman test as suggested by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993). Should the test results in turn indicate that the set of estimates obtained by least 
squares (LS) are inconsistent, there would be a need to introduce the threshold regression with 
instrumental variables (IV) proposed by Caner and Hansen (2004) for further robustness checks. 
Otherwise, we should prefer the least squares results based on Hansen (2000) given that it is the 
most efficient.
23
  
4. Data and initial results 
In this section we firstly present an overview of the data and descriptive statistics associated with 
our analysis. In the subsequent sections, we report the initial empirical results and distinct policy 
implications associated with our main research objectives. 
4.1. Database and descriptive statistics 
This study focuses exclusively on Islamic and conventional commercial banks in 18 countries were 
both Islamic and conventional banks coexist. We therefore exclude from our analysis individual 
banks in countries that have full fledged Islamic banking systems, namely Iran and Sudan. 
Specifically, the panel data set comprises a total of 170 banks (108 conventional banks and 62 
Islamic banks) over the period 2005-2012. Our bank selection process is governed primarily by the 
obtainability of publically available disclosures of capital ratios for the banks that are in line with 
the requirements of the respective national authorities and the applicable Basel capital adequacy 
guidelines. In line with Stolz and Wedow (2011), we also exclude banks from our sample with 
negative capital buffers given that these banks are in breach of the respective capital adequacy 
guidelines and may be distressed. We also omit initial bank capital buffer observations for banks 
incorporated during the period under study given the potential upward bias resulting from banks not 
being fully operational during that period.
24
 Based on the above criteria, our final sample consists of 
an unbalanced panel data set of 128 commercial banks of which 44 are Islamic commercial banks.  
We construct bank specific measures for the commercial banks in our sample using unconsolidated 
and consolidated individual bank balance sheet and income statement data from the Bureau Van 
Dijk Bankscope database as well as publicly available individual audited financial statement where 
available. In relation to the Islamic commercial banks, it is important to note the standardized 
financial information obtained from Bankscope does not factor the differences in financial 
accounting (AAOIFI versus IFRS compliant) as well as the appropriate grouping of line items for 
Islamic banks relative to conventional banks. Key financial information for constructing our main 
Islamic bank specific measures were therefore manually derived from the banks’ publicly available 
audited financial statements.  
Information on the minimum bank capital requirements in each jurisdiction used to construct our 
measure for capital buffers          is obtained directly from the websites of the central banks. 
The total banking system assets used for constructing the       measures were obtained from 
                                                        
23 As suggested by Law et al. (2013) on using the threshold estimation technique in order to examine whether the 
growth effect of financial development in countries with distinct levels of institutional development differs. 
24 Banks during the initial stages following incorporation are in the process of implementing their investment and 
funding decisions and hence have abnormally high capital buffers during that period.  
 
 
 
 
financial worksheets disclosed on the respective central banks’ websites. The total assets of the top 
three and top four banks in each jurisdiction were obtained from the Bankscope database. The 
         measures on the other hand was obtained from the annual financial development reports 
of the World Economic Forum. The          and             measures where obtained from 
the World Economic Outlook database of the International Monetary Fund.  
In line with Lee and Hsieh (2013), the data upon which the       and          indices are 
constructed are obtained from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Database of the World Bank. 
The criteria for constructing the bank specific dummy variables are also based on information from 
the Bankscope database. And finally, it is important to note the limitations associated with the 
availability and quality of data for the developing countries in our sample.  
In relation to our second critical question at hand, given that both our proxies for the charter value 
of the bank       are market based measures, our sample in relation to this sub section is further 
restricted to only publicly-listed conventional and Islamic commercial banks in the jurisdictions 
where both Islamic and conventional banking systems coexist. This in turn results in a final data set 
consisting of 101 publicly listed commercial banks of which 25 are Islamic commercial banks.
25
 
Key financial and market-based data used for constructing our bank charter value proxies       ) 
and         were obtained from the Bankscope database and the respective stock exchanges 
websites. To examine the non-linear behaviour of charter values in relation to banks’ capital buffers 
as implied by theory, we therefore assume a cross sectional data set rather than a panel data 
approach as discussed in the earlier section.   
 Table 1 summarizes the median values of the bank and country level variables over the sample 
period (2005-2012) by country. The Islamic (IB) and conventional (CB) commercial banks in our 
sample span several regions including the Middle East, North Africa and Turkey (MENAT) as well 
as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) regions. Of these countries, 7 of them 
have instituted some form of an explicit deposit insurance scheme to act as a financial system safety 
net, whilst the other 11 countries have an implicit deposit insurance mechanism in place. Over the 
sample period, MENAT region banks seem to exhibit the highest relative capital buffers           
on average (1.01), followed by ASEAN region banks (.89) and South Asian banks (.43) 
respectively.
26
 Based on bank type, Islamic banks in the MENAT region also exhibit the highest 
        measures on average (1.28) relative to Islamic banks in other regions.
27
ASEAN region 
conventional banks on the other hand exhibit the highest         measure on average (.84) relative 
to conventional banks in other regions. It is also relevant to note that over the entire sample, a 
higher         measure was reported for Islamic banks (1.07)  relative to conventional banks (.69) 
on average.  
Table 2 provides the matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients, which based on the results, 
indicates relatively weak association between the variables on average (less than .3). 
 
                                                        
25 Within this context, it is important to note that in jurisdictions such as Malaysia most Islamic banks are subsidiaries 
of conventional banks, and hence, the Islamic banking subsidiaries are not individually listed on the public exchanges. 
26 Based on sample averages of the median values by country as indicated in Table 1. 
27         measures are at an average of .93 for ASEAN Islamic banks and .55 for South Asian Islamic banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Notes: Summary of descriptive statistics. Indicates the median values for each country. * Represents the countries for which explicit deposit insurance schemes are in place for all banks. 
 
 
Region Country BNK TYPE BNK NUM RBUF ASSETSPR DEPOSIT ROE NPL LOANSCD EQTYFIN SIZE TOBINSQ REGCAP CR3 FINDEV GDPGR
IB 5 0.85        0.01        0.49        0.07        0.05        0.80        0.04        8.11        0.92        
CB 4 0.58        0.01        0.44        0.15        0.04        0.94        n.a. 8.68        1.05        
IB 1 0.77        0.02        0.69        0.08        0.40        0.72        -          8.54        0.95        
CB 2 0.42        0.01        0.51        0.23        0.03        0.56        n.a. 8.50        1.03        
IB 2 0.77        0.00        0.63        0.15        0.05        1.54        0.01        7.55        1.06        
CB 6 0.64        0.01        0.43        0.11        0.06        0.70        n.a. 7.94        1.08        
IB 3 0.90        0.00        0.76        0.05        0.09        1.00        -          8.42        1.11        
CB 4 0.50        0.01        0.56        0.16        0.03        1.04        n.a. 9.21        1.19        
IB 2 0.69        0.00        0.62        -          -          -          -          5.71        -          
CB 2 0.39        0.02        0.24        0.19        0.04        0.38        n.a. 6.40        1.11        
IB 3 0.98        0.02        0.68        0.16        0.02        0.98        0.03        8.97        1.14        
CB 6 0.68        0.01        0.51        0.18        0.01        0.95        n.a. 9.00        1.07        
IB 3 1.48        0.01        0.28        0.23        0.03        0.79        -          9.08        1.24        
CB 6 1.13        0.02        0.46        0.18        0.02        0.82        n.a. 10.42      1.12        
IB 2 5.41        0.00        0.70        -          0.08        0.64        -          6.28        -          
CB 3 1.02        0.00        0.56        0.11        0.04        0.40        n.a. 7.14        1.12        
IB 4 0.89        0.01        0.76        0.17        0.03        1.03        -          8.60        1.01        
CB 10 0.97        0.02        0.63        0.19        0.03        1.07        n.a. 9.84        1.06        
IB 4 0.51        0.01        0.67        0.11        0.06        0.89        -          9.21        0.97        
CB 13 0.77        0.01        0.55        0.14        0.03        1.04        n.a. 9.46        0.99        
IB 1 0.85        0.02        0.72        0.02        0.02        0.27        0.27        7.42        -          
CB 2 1.15        0.00        0.50        0.33        0.35        0.28        n.a. 6.09        -          
IB 1 1.77        0.01        0.09        0.09        0.11        0.78        -          8.19        -          
CB 0 -          -          -          -          -          -          n.a. -          -          
IB 3 0.56        0.00        0.82        0.18        0.04        0.87        0.39        7.60        -          
CB 14 1.02        0.01        0.50        0.12        0.03        0.84        n.a. 8.39        1.07        
IB 15 0.78        0.01        0.54        0.10        0.02        0.87        -          8.07        -          
CB 13 0.72        0.01        0.53        0.16        0.03        0.80        n.a. 9.58        1.13        
IB 1 0.62        -          0.85        0.05        0.09        0.93        -          7.23        -          
CB 1 0.78        0.00        -          0.12        0.07        0.98        n.a. 10.76      -          
IB 6 0.12        0.01        0.77        0.20        0.02        0.93        -          6.63        1.09        
CB 10 0.17        0.01        0.54        0.21        0.04        0.88        n.a. 6.81        1.11        
IB 5 0.98        0.02        0.73       0.00        0.06        0.56        0.32        6.23        0.99        
CB 11 0.44        0.01        0.27        0.15        0.09        0.72        n.a. 8.15        0.99        
IB 1 0.38        0.00        0.99        0.06        -          0.90        0.67        5.77        -          
CB 1 0.32        0.05        0.18        0.25        0.04        0.89        n.a. 11.50      -          
0.72        0.01        0.53        0.15        0.03        0.88        -          8.47        1.06        0.10        0.43        3.23        0.05        
0.85        0.01        0.53        0.15        0.05        0.89        0.03        8.47        1.08        0.10        0.44        2.50        0.05        
0.72        0.01        0.19        0.10        0.06        0.36        0.10        1.52        0.18        0.02        0.17        1.65        0.03        
South Africa          0.10          0.76          3.59          0.03 Africa
BANK LEVEL VARIABLES
Pakistan          0.10          0.38 
ASEAN
Bangladesh*          0.10          0.30 
Brunei          0.10               -   
Yemen          0.08          0.34 
Palestinian Ter.
South 
Asia
Malaysia*
         2.62          0.04 
              -            0.00 
Indonesia*          0.08          0.38          2.90          0.06 
         2.57          0.06 
         0.08          0.40          4.22          0.05 
Thailand*          0.09          0.43          3.36          0.03 
MENAT
Turkey*          0.08          0.41          3.18          0.05 
United Arab Emirates          0.12          0.42          4.03          0.05 
Saudi Arabia          0.08          0.46          3.89          0.05 
Syria          0.08          0.60               -            0.04 
              -            0.04 
         0.05 
Jordan*          0.12 
         0.12          0.52               -                 -   
Qatar          0.10          0.62               -            0.14 
Median 
Mean
Standard deviation
COUNTRY LEVEL VARIABLES
Egypt          0.10 0.44        3.28        0.05        
Bahrain*          0.12          0.32          3.90          0.05 
         0.49          3.65          0.07 
Kuwait          0.12          0.72          3.73 
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Notes: *** and ** and * indicate the one, five, and ten percent significance levels respectively. RBUF represents the banks' capital buffers. The ASSETSPR represents the absolute spread between the return on 
assets (ROA) and the returns on depositors’ funds. The EQTYSPR represents the absolute spread between the average return on equity and the returns on depositors’ funds. DEPOSIT is the level of unrestricted 
PSIAs relative to total liabilities for Islamic banks, and similar tenured deposits for conventional banks. ROE, NPL, and LOANSCD are proxies for the opportunity cost of capital, bank risk, and the level of 
financial intermediation respectively. EQTYFIN and FIXEDRTFIN represent the level of PLS based financing and fixed rate financing relative to total financing respectively. SIZE represents the natural logarithm 
of total bank assets. TOBINSQ is a measure of market power defined as the current market value of a firm's assets (the market value of its equity plus debt) divided by their current cost to a firm. REGCAP 
represents the regulatory minimum capital requirements in each country in 2011.CR3 represents the three bank concentration ratio. FINDEV is the financial development index provided by the World Economic 
Forum. GDPGR is the annual growth of real gross domestic product. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
28 Kennedy (2008) indicates multicollinearity a critical problem with correlations above 0.80, which is not the case here as indicated in the table. 
Pearson correlation coefficients
RBUF ASSETSPR EQTYSPR DEPOSIT ROE NPL LOANSCD EQTYFIN FIXEDTRFIN SIZE TOBINSQ CR3 FINDEV GDPGR
RBUF 1.0
ASSETSPR 0.1783*** 1.0
EQTYSPR -0.097*** 0.247*** 1.0
DEPOSIT 0.0386 -0.0925*** -0.143*** 1.0
ROE -0.1727*** -0.1494** 0.616*** -0.119*** 1.0
NPL -0.0062 0.0212 -0.028 -0.0867*** -0.1843*** 1.0
LOANSCD -0.0302 0.0453 -0.116*** 0.0064 -0.0293 -0.2343*** 1.0
EQTYFIN 0.0572** 0.1354*** -0.083*** 0.2913*** -0.2161*** 0.0133 -0.0776** 1.0
FIXEDTRFIN 0.1564*** -0.0354 0.102* -0.1794*** 0.0901 0.0188 0.0396 -0.6007*** 1.0
SIZE -0.1004*** -0.0317 0.179*** -0.1856*** 0.2156*** -0.2222*** 0.1349*** -0.2511*** 0.2367*** 1.0
TOBINSQ  0.1344*** -0.0073 0.275*** -0.0571 0.268*** -0.2287*** 0.0081 -0.114*** 0.351*** 0.0977** 1.0
CR3 0.099*** 0.0123 0.023 0.025 -0.0597* -0.0618* 0.0312 0.0091 0.1919*** 0.2282*** 0.1553*** 1.0
FINDEV 0.1773*** -0.0771* -0.053 -0.0554 -0.2107*** -0.0918** 0.0887** -0.1285*** 0.152** 0.4203*** -0.0885* 0.3495*** 1.0
GDPGR -0.0509* 0.0164 0.16*** -0.0118 0.2017*** -0.2121*** 0.0456 -0.0642** 0.062 -0.0441 0.0821** 0.1519*** -0.1588*** 1.0
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4.2. Islamic banks’ capital buffers and their unique risk exposures 
As reported earlier, we proceed with the difference GMM estimation, given the relatively low level 
of persistence in the time series dimension of capital buffers, and for which high persistence in the 
series is a necessary condition for expectations of asymptotic efficiency gains using the system 
GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). As discussed earlier, the possibility of “instrument proliferation” 
also warrants the application of difference GMM.Given that the two-step estimates of the standard 
errors tend to be severely downward biased (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998), 
we then apply the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer 
(2005) prior to reporting our results for the first-difference GMM below.
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 We report our results 
using the full sample of banks of hand, as well as subsamples that are further classified by 
commercial bank type (whether Islamic or conventional banks). We also check the robustness of 
our empirical results firstly by considering modifications to our empirical model as applied to both 
the full and subsamples of banks respectively and also control for time fixed effects.  
4.2.1. Full and sub sample tests 
Table 3 reports our initial results in connection to our first critical question using the full sample of 
banks on hand (both Islamic and conventional banks). As indicated across all specifications (SPEC 
1-6), the non-significance of the AR (2) statistic indicates no second order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced errors, which is a required condition for the consistency of the GMM estimates.
30
 
Firstly, it is important to note that the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant at the 
one per cent level across the specifications, in line with earlier findings in other empirical studies 
(Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2010; Stolz and Wedow, 2011; and Jokipii and Milne, 2011). This result 
confirms our choice of a dynamic specification for our model. 
On evaluating the impact of bank specific variables associated with the critical issue on hand, the 
           variable is not significant across most of the specifications.  Interacting the Islamic 
bank dummy with the asset spread measure (                    ) however results in an 
estimated coefficient that is positive in line with expectations and statistically significant at the ten 
per cent level in four out of the six specifications (significant at five per cent level in SPEC3). The 
estimated coefficient for           is also not significant across the specifications. Having said 
that, the estimated coefficient for                   has a positive sign in line with 
expectations and is statistically significant at the five per cent level in four of the six specifications 
(significance level of ten per cent in SPECS 1 and 4). Our findings with regards to both measures 
expose potential shortcomings in capital adequacy guidelines as Islamic banks seem to adjust their 
own capital buffers in an effort to more accurately reflect their own in-house perspectives and risk 
outlooks when mitigating the effects of ROR risk and DCR. This is in line with the literature (Hall 
et. al, 2000; Archer et. al, 2010; Farook et. al, 2012). The statistically significant positive 
                                                        
29 With regards to the post estimation specification test results, the distribution of the Sargan test is not known when the 
disturbances are heteroskedastic, and hence a robust version of the Sargan test is not available after specifying vce 
(robust) in STATA. As discussed earlier, given that the gmm two-step standard errors are downward biased, robust 
standard errors are recommended. The vce(robust) uses the robust estimator. For the two-step estimator, vce(robust) 
represents the Windmeijer WC-robust estimator. A robust version of the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation is 
however available and produced in all the tables. Specifying WC-robust standard errors also produces variance-
covariance estimates that are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
30 The null of no first-order serial correlation was rejected across all specifications, which is also correct. 
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relationship for                   also suggests Islamic banks might not manage their UPSIAs 
in line with their inherent risk absorbent and hence succumb to supervisory and competitive 
pressures in the market place. From a regulatory and supervisory perspective, adequate measures 
must be taken to enhance regulatory capital standards for Islamic banks across jurisdictions in order 
to more accurately take into account the unique operations of these financial institutions. Given that 
Islamic banks’ capital buffers seem larger on average relative to their conventional peers (see table 
2), the further enhancement of regulatory standards in relation to mitigating the effects of ROR and 
DCR might also serve to free up excess capital (reduce capital buffers) in the long run and hence 
improve their ability to compete going forward.  
It is also important to note the estimated coefficient                           is negative and 
statistically significant at the ten per cent level in SPEC 6. This suggests state owned Islamic banks 
might operate differently to both privately owned Islamic banks and conventional banks in general. 
We also include a set of regional dummy variables           that are not reported in Table 3 in 
order to save space. Our results suggest no clear differences in economic significance when 
interacting our primary variables of interest with the regional dummies. Having said that, the 
estimated coefficient for                       is negative in value and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The                           on the other hand is 
positive and statistically significant at the ten per cent level. Both results aren’t in line with our 
earlier findings, as the sign of the estimated coefficient for            in SPEC 2 is positive but 
not statistically significant. 
We also repeat the above analysis on subsamples of banks that are further classified by commercial 
bank type, namely Islamic versus conventional banks. Our main results are broadly in line with our 
earlier findings for the full sample tests. All sub-samples test estimation tables are available upon 
request.  
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31
 
 
Full sample tests: Estimation method is the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged 
dependent variables. The dependent variable is RBUF, which represents the banks' capital buffers. All other variables are described 
in section 3.2.1 and the variables summary tables in Appendix B. We estimate regressions for 2005-2012 (annual frequency). 
Windmeijer corrected (WC-robust) standard errors are in parentheses. The null hypothesis of the serial correlation test is that the 
errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of one percent, five percent and ten 
percent respectively. 
 
 
                                                        
31 Given that the GMM two-step standard errors are downward biased, robust standard errors are recommended. A 
robust version of the Sargan test however is not available in STATA after specifying vce(robust) which represents the 
Windmeijer WC-robust estimator. Country and region dummy variables are included but not reported. We introduce 
time fixed effects (time dummies) to account for any cross sectional dependence in the data. In line with Nier and 
Baumann (2006) and Silaghi et. al (2014) we control for time fixed effects as part of our robustness checks exclusively 
in Table 5. Given the limitations associated with the relatively short time span covered in our panel data set, we do not 
include any time trend component. The introduction of time fixed effects represents however a tighter control (Nier and 
Baumann, 2006). Tests of joint significance are conducted but not reported. In line with the arbitrary rule of thumb 
suggested by Roodman (2009), the number of instruments doesn’t outnumber the individual units (number of groups) in 
the panel suggesting potential problems of instrument proliferation are not apparent. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RBUF t-1 0.357*** 0.281** 0.336*** 0.35*** 0.353*** 0.356***
[0.091] [0.11] [0.089] [0.095] [0.09] [0.09]
ASSETSPR 2.844 2.03 2.361 2.650 2.831 2.801
[2.158] [2.238] [2.146] [2.206] [2.105] [2.161]
IBDUM x ASSETSPR 5.503* 5.984* 6.588** 4.996 5.595* 5.623*
[3.163] [3.16] [3.182] [3.246] [3.16] [3.188]
EQTYFIN 0.757
[0.817]
DEPOSIT 0.108 0.039 0.121 0.100 0.105 0.102
[0.191] [0.194] [0.195] [0.191] [0.191] [0.19]
IBDUM x DEPOSIT 1.012* 1.213** 1.009** 0.93* 1.031** 1.15**
[0.536] [0.509] [0.497] [0.536] [0.524] [0.556]
ROE 0.204 0.186 0.199 0.219 0.211 0.198
[0.393] [0.378] [0.364] [0.377] [0.395] [0.397]
NPL -1.205** -1.225** -1.195** -1.197** -1.2*** -1.251***
[0.475] [0.499] [0.468] [0.496] [0.457] [0.469]
LOANSCD -0.216 -0.274* -0.170 -0.211 -0.21 -0.223
[0.155] [0.145] [0.161] [0.165] [0.16] [0.156]
SIZE -0.119 -0.16* -0.138 -0.091 -0.113 -0.114
[0.092] [0.085] [0.09] [0.105] [0.093] [0.091]
IBDUM x SIZE -0.088
[0.143]
CR3 1.411 0.874 -0.490 1.264 1.459 1.408
[1.054] [1.135] [1.315] [1.059] [1.046] [1.049]
IBDUM x CR3 4.211**
[1.9]
FINDEV -0.923*** -1.002*** -1.035*** -0.902*** -0.917*** -0.922***
[0.230] [0.235] [0.236] [0.235] [0.234] [0.23]
GDPGR -1.429*** -1.228*** -1.28*** -1.502*** -1.479*** -1.428***
[0.451] [0.469] [0.432] [0.458] [0.517] [0.451]
IBDUM x GDPGR 0.172
[0.826]
STATE x IBDUM x DEPOSIT -1.2*
[0.646]
No of observations 380 380 380 380 380 380
No of banks 128 128 128 128 128 128
Instruments 30 31 31 31 31 31
AR(1) test -3.206*** -2.54** -3.146*** -3.091*** -3.194*** -3.181***
AR(2) test 1.037 0.977 1.013 1.072 1.034 1.008
All banks :Dependent variable RBUF
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4.2.3. Robustness checks 
In Table 4 we check the robustness of our empirical results by considering modifications to our 
empirical model as applied to both the full and subsamples of banks respectively. In the first 
specification (SPEC 1), we include an additional measure of the level of profit distribution 
management, namely the equity spread             . Having said that, we remove the        
measure from this specification in view of the relatively strong association (.616) between this 
measure and the equity spread as depicted in the matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients (Table 
2).Whilst the estimated coefficient for the            is negative and statistically significant at the 
five percent level, on interaction with the Islamic bank dummy,                   is non-
significant. It is important to note however the equity spread is not as reliable a measure as the asset 
spread for examining this issue (Farook et. al, 2012). 
In Table 5 we introduce time dummies    ) in order to account for any cross sectional dependence 
in the data. Within this context, our results reveal for the time dummies covering the period under 
study, the only statistically significant coefficient relates to the 2008 period dummy. All other time 
dummy coefficients are not significant, and hence not reported. We therefore proceed to examine 
the robustness of our main results whilst controlling for the recent crisis. In line with Beck et al. 
(2013), we interact       with a crisis dummy (CRISIS), and which takes on the value one for the 
2008 period and zero otherwise. As indicated in SPEC 1 our prior main findings for Islamic banks 
are broadly confirmed after controlling for time fixed effects. In SPEC 4, it is also important to note 
the statistically significant negative coefficient on examining the effects of the business cycle on 
Islamic banks’ capital buffers during the crisis period                         . The 
coefficient is significantly higher than the comparable coefficient for conventional banks, and does 
not support the findings of Beck et al. (2013), which suggest Islamic banks are less likely to dis-
intermediate during crises.  
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Robustness checks: Estimation method is the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with 
lagged dependent variables. The dependent variable is RBUF, which represents the banks' capital buffers. All other variables are 
described in section 3.2.1 and the variables summary tables in Appendix B. We estimate regressions for 2005-2012 (annual 
frequency). WC-robust standard errors are in parentheses. The null hypothesis of the serial correlation test is that the errors exhibit no 
second-order serial correlation. ***,** and * indicate significance levels of one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively.	
 
 
 
 
                                                        
32 Given that the GMM two-step standard errors are downward biased, robust standard errors are recommended. A 
robust version of the Sargan test however is not available in STATA after specifying vce(robust) which represents the 
Windmeijer WC-robust estimator. Country and region dummy variables are included but not reported. We introduce 
time fixed effects (time dummies) to account for any cross sectional dependence in the data in table 5. Tests of joint 
significance are also conducted but not reported. In line with Roodman (2009)’s rule of thumb, the number of 
instruments doesn’t outnumber the number of groups in the panel.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All 
banks
All 
banks
All 
banks
All 
banks
Islamic
banks
Islamic
banks
Conventional 
banks
RBUF t-1 0.325*** 0.371*** 0.3828*** 0.37*** 0.304*** 0.305** 0.265**
[0.086] [0.093] [0.092] [0.093] [0.098] [0.132] [0.111]
ASSETSPR 3.56* 2.623 2.814 2.912 10.174** 10.839*** 0.917
[2.012] [2.212] [2.337] [2.248] [4.06] [3.498] [2.518]
IBDUM x ASSETSPR 5.177* 5.342 4.33 4.876
[3.074] [3.348] [3.642] [3.317]
EQTYSPR -0.767**
[0.354]
IBDUM x EQTYSPR -0.715
[0.71]
DEPOSIT 0.057 0.072 0.059 0.077 1.196*** 1.14*** -0.121
[0.191] [0.195] [0.197] [0.196] [0.436] [0.368] [0.266]
IBDUM x DEPOSIT 1.096** 1.06** 1.014* 1.054*
[0.525] [0.535] [0.556] [0.546]
EQTYFIN -0.602
[1.442]
FIXEDRTFIN -0.553
[0.443]
ROE 0.248 0.271 0.307 1.577** 1.633*** -0.459
[0.406] [0.406] [0.399] [0.633] [0.574] [0.358]
NPL -0.936* -1.379*** -0.874 -1.471*** 0.652 0.14 -1.616*
[0.529] [0.468] [0.836] [0.49] [1.639] [1.464] [0.936]
LLP -1.118 -4.071 -2.553
[1.663] [3.329] [2.461]
LOANSCD -0.157 -0.245 -0.241 -0.247 0.136 0.138 -0.593**
[0.172] [0.171] [0.162] [0.168] [0.307] [0.313] [0.26]
SIZE -0.141* -0.146 -0.141 -0.161* -0.235* -0.213 -0.143
[0.084] [0.093] [0.095] [0.091] [0.141] [0.153] [0.108]
CR3 1.605 2.169** 2.359**
[0.985] [0.965] [0.96]
CR4 1.663* 3.509** 3.696 -0.934
[0.867] [1.71] [2.329] [0.861]
FINDEV -0.875*** -1.18*** -1.187*** -1.172** -2.099*** -1.689** -0.686**
[0.225] [0.295] [0.3] [0.298] [0.703] [0.924] [0.302]
GDPGR -1.261*** -1.391***
[0.428] [0.512]
GDPCAPGR -0.79** -0.826** -0.805** 0.438 0.506
[0.398] [0.397] [0.401] [0.817] [0.683]
No of observations 377 380 379 380 119 119 261
No of banks 128 128 128 128 44 44 84
Instruments 31 30 31 30 30 30 28
AR(1) test -3.173*** -3.213*** -3.26*** -3.222*** -2.167** -2.135** -2.289**
AR(2) test 1.304 1.233 1.251 1.21 0.344 0.241 1.384
Dependent variable RBUF
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Table 5
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Robustness check using time dummies: Estimation method is the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM difference estimator for 
panel data. All variables are described in section 3.2.1 and the variables summary tables in Appendix B. We estimate regressions for 
2005-2012 (annual frequency). Windmeijer corrected (WC-robust) standard errors are in parentheses. The null hypothesis of the 
serial correlation test is that the errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of one 
percent, five percent and ten percent respectively. a In SPEC 7 we did not interact the CRISIS period dummy with IBDUM as the 
sample consists exclusively of conventional banks. 
 
 
                                                        
33 Given that the GMM two-step standard errors are downward biased, robust standard errors are recommended. A 
robust version of the Sargan test however is not available in STATA after specifying vce (robust) that represents the 
Windmeijer WC-robust estimator. Country and region dummy variables are included but not reported. We introduce 
time fixed effects (time dummies) to account for any cross sectional dependence in the data. The only statistically 
significant coefficient however relates to the 2008 crisis period. We therefore include a crisis dummy to examine the 
robustness of our main results whilst controlling for the recent financial crisis. Given the limitations associated with the 
relatively short time span covered in our panel data set, we do not include any time trend component. The introduction 
of time fixed effects, however represents a tighter control (Nier and Baumann, 2006).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All 
banks
All 
banks
All 
banks
All 
banks
All 
banks
Islamic 
banks
Conventional
banks
RBUF t-1 0.379*** 0.349*** 0.371*** 0.381*** 0.376*** 0.396*** 0.342***
[0.089] [0.093] [0.089] [0.088] [0.095] [0.099] [0.088]
ASSETSPR 2.908 2.798 2.938 2.953 2.934 10.863** 2.097
[2.218] [2.123] [2.19] [2.158] [2.143] [4.245] [2.67]
IBDUM x ASSETSPR 5.667* 5.598* 5.687* 5.424* 4.143
[3.207] [3.357] [3.202] [3.176] [3.598]
DEPOSIT 0.066 0.086 0.087 0.059 0.095 1.074** -.072
[0.192] [0.191] [0.192] [0.194] [0.191] [0.529] [0.218]
IBDUM x DEPOSIT 1.141** 1.007* 1.012* 1.016** 0.894*
[0.540] [0.539] [0.532] [0.507] [0.541]
STATE x IBDUM x DEPOSIT -1.385**
[0.633]
ROE 0.305 0.128 0.275 0.332 0.336 1.768*** -.357
[0.411] [0.393] [0.405] [0.413] [0.408] [0.649] [0.405]
NPL -1.33*** -1.211** -1.223** -1.363*** -1.278** -1.793* -1.423
[0.493] [0.492] [0.486] [0.497] [0.546] [0.956] [0.933]
LOANSCD -0.277** -0.229 -0.236 -0.296* -0.238 -0.044 -0.505**
[0.150] [0.156] [0.153] [0.115] [0.159] [0.269] [0.257]
SIZE -0.158* -0.118 -0.147 -0.167* -0.187* -0.271** -0.227*
[0.095] [0.096] [0.096] [0.094] [0.098] [0.140] [0.119]
CR3 1.219 1.375 1.288 1.332 0.831 3.576* 0.027
[1.079] [1.08] [1.081] [0.074] [1.15] [2.062] [1.238]
FINDEV -0.867*** -0.925*** -0.880*** -0.830*** -1.027*** -0.426 0.31
[0.228] [0.235] [0.231] [0.236] [0.274] [0.731] [0.399]
IBDUM x FINDEV 1.082
0.918
GDPGR -1.324*** -1.402*** -1.366*** -1.562*** -1.274*** 0.301 -1.024**
[0.459] [0.456] [0.460] [0.502] [0.452] [0.871] [0.501]
IBDUM x GDPGR 0.763
[0.797]
IBDUM x CRISIS
a
-0.153* -0.238** -0.326*** -0.209***
[0.081] [0.107] [0.084] [0.058]
IBDUM x ASSETSPR x CRISIS -0.758
[7.101]
IBDUM x DEPOSIT x CRISIS -0.163
[0.119]
IBDUM x GDPGR x CRISIS -4.051**
[1.887]
No of observations 380 380 380 380 380 119 261
No of banks 128 128 128 128 128 44 84
Instruments 32 31 31 32 32 29 29
AR(1) test -3.227*** -3.174*** -3.219*** -3.173*** -3.061*** -2.135** -2.7086**
AR(2) test 0.892 0.972 0.852 0.91 0.893 -0.074 1.7047*
Dependent variable RBUF
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4.3. The relationship between banks’ charter values and capital buffers 
In connection to our second critical question, table 6 reports our results from testing the null 
hypothesis of linearity (           against the threshold model defined in section 3, and which in 
turn allows us to establish the presence of a charter value threshold effect as implied by theory 
(Milne and Whalley, 2001). For this purpose, we use our two measures of market power, namely 
      and       as defined earlier. Following Hansen (2000), the statistical significance of the 
threshold estimate is determined via the p-value subject to 1000 bootstrap replications and a 15% 
trimming percentage. As indicated, our results suggest possible threshold effects in both charter 
value measures, whereas the bootstrap p-values are statistically significant at the one percent level 
in the four model specifications (first sample split). Our first sample-split results therefore indicate 
our sample can be split into two regimes regardless of whether we use       or       as our 
measure of market power. As indicated in the table, our threshold point estimates using       are 
0.96 with 95% confidence intervals of (.95,.96) and 1.04 with 95% confidence intervals of 
(1.04,1.05) in models 1a and 2a respectively. On the other hand our threshold point estimate using 
      is 1.46 in both models, however, with different 95% confidence intervals of (.49,1.59) and 
(1.22,1.54) in models 1b and 2b respectively. This implies that our regime switching trigger       
divides our sample of banks into those with threshold values equal to or below the point estimate 
(0.96 and 1.04 respectively for models 1a and 2a), and which in turn are classified as low charter 
value banks (low charter value bank environment), and those above the point estimate, which are 
classified as high charter value banks (high charter value bank environment). Based on       on 
the other hand, our banks are classified as to whether the threshold values figure equal to or below 
the point estimate 1.46 or above that point estimate, and are in turn similarly classified. We also test 
whether the high charter value group could be further split into sub-regimes. Whilst the bootstrap p-
values were insignificant in models 1a, 2a, and 2b, it is relevant to note that the bootstrap p-value in 
model 1b of .049 suggests an additional threshold might be relevant for this model (a second sample 
split).  
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Table 6 
 
Notes: Null hypothesis (H0) of no threshold effect 
 
 
 
In table 7 we present our empirical results using       and       as our charter value threshold 
variables, and       as our explanatory variable of interest.
34
 As indicated in both threshold 
models 1a and 1b, the coefficient of the charter value measure       is negative and statistically 
significant at the one per cent level when the size of the charter value falls below the threshold 
level, and non-significant when the size of the charter value falls above the threshold level. This 
result would in turn suggest that the relationship between banks’ charter values and capital buffers 
is non-linear. Our results seem to suggest increased competition might enhance the self-disciplining 
behaviour of banks. This seems to be the case given evidence of a negative relationship in a low 
charter value environment, which is suggestive of competition in the banking system, and is in line 
with the “charter value effect”. This indicates as the charter value falls, banks are motivated to 
maintain larger capital buffers in order to protect the valuable charter. On the other hand, our results 
for charter values above the threshold level seem to suggest that high charter value banks are not 
responsive to fluctuations in their franchise values from a risk management perspective. This might 
                                                        
34 Within this context, it is important to note that Hansen (2000) allows for the threshold variable to be an element of 
the m-vector of explanatory variables. This is particularly relevant given that as noted earlier, the charter value of the 
bank      acts as both the threshold variable and the explanatory variable of interest,    , in the above empirical 
model.   
Threshold estimates of charter values (CV)
Model 1 Model 2
Charter values=CVTBQ Charter values=CVPBV
Model 1a Model 1b
First sample split
LM test for no threshold 16.221 20.573
Bootstrap p- value 0.004 0.000
Threshold estimate 0.96 1.46
95% confidence intervals (.95,.96) (.49,1.59)
Second sample split
LM test for no threshold 10.672 12.994
Bootstrap p- value 0.182 0.049
Threshold estimate -                             2.2
95% confidence intervals -                             (2.2,2.48)
Model 2a Model 2b
First sample split
LM test for no threshold 21.221 21.958
Bootstrap p- value 0.001 0.000
Threshold estimate 1.04 1.46
95% confidence intervals (1.04,1.05) (1.22,1.54)
Second sample split
LM test for no threshold 7.684 9.986
Bootstrap p- value 0.541 0.282
CV= Tobins q ratio
CV= Price to book value
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have implications given that the effective management of capital buffers is reflective of the risk 
outlook of the banks going forward, and taking into account as well the importance of capital in 
reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy and financial distress costs. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
 
Notes: Regression results using charter values (CV) as a threshold variable. The dependent variable RBUF represents banks' capital buffers. The explanatory charter value variable is Tobin’s q ratio 
(CVTBQ). All other variables are described in section 3.2.1 and the variables summary tables in Appendix B. The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for heteroskedasticity). 
Results correspond to trimming percentages of 15%. ** and *** indicate significance levels of five percent and one percent respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear model
OLS without threshold Regime 1 CV≤0.96 Regime 2 CV>0.96 Regime 1 CV≤1.46 Regime 2 CV>1.46
Constant -5.259*** -5.604** -5.265*** -0.519 -8.534***
(1.04) (1.841) (1.11) (1.371) (1.549)
CV TBQ -0.284 -0.48** 0.871 -0.966*** -0.045
(0.296) (0.183) (0.749) (0.317) (1.138)
NPL -0.185** -0.129 -0.249** -0.162 -0.256**
(0.084) (0.105) (0.097) (0.104) (0.118)
GDPGR -0.734** -1.924** -0.397 0.252 -1.564**
(0.364) (0.727) (0.367) (0.477) (0.607)
FINDEV 1.566*** -0.829 2.11*** 0.282 1.985***
(0.444) (0.77) (0.438) (0.66) (0.512)
R-sq 0.269 0.33 0.344 0.123 0.529
Heteroskedasticity test (p -value) 0.019 - - - -
No. of observations 101 14 87 46 55
Threshold model 1a (charter values=CVTBQ) Threshold model 1b (charter values=CVPBV)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
 
Notes: Regression results using charter values (CV) as a threshold variable. The dependent variable RBUF represents banks' capital buffers. The explanatory charter value variable is the price to book 
value ratio (CVPBV). All other variables are described in section 3.2.1 and the variables summary tables in Appendix B. The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for 
heteroskedasticity). Results correspond to trimming percentages of 15%. ** and *** indicate significance levels of five percent and one percent respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear model
OLS without threshold Regime 1 CV≤1.04 Regime 2 CV>1.04 Regime 1 CV≤1.46 Regime 2 CV>1.46
Constant -4.91*** -2.697** -6.914*** -0.5 -8.394***
(1.022) (1.306) (1.259) (1.341) (1.375)
CV PBV -0.202 -0.711*** -0.531 -0.483*** -0.251
(0.104) (0.162) (0.265) (0.168) (0.28)
NPL -0.233*** -0.271*** -0.191 -0.233** -0.271**
(0.083) (0.098) (0.112) (0.102) (0.112)
GDPGR -0.578 -0.1562 -1.26** 0.39 -1.576***
(0.363) (0.433) (0.476) (0.458) (0.543)
FINDEV 1.597*** 0.595 2.001*** 0.414 1.968***
(0.437) (0.586) (0.486) (0.604) (0.497)
R-sq 0.29 0.338 0.48 0.196 0.537
Heteroskedasticity test (p -value) 0.023 - - - -
No. of observations 101 44 57 46 55
Threshold model 2a (charter values=CVTBQ) Threshold model 2b (charter values=CVPBV)
 
 
 
 
In table 8 we present our empirical results using       and       as our charter value threshold 
variables, and       as our explanatory variable of interest. Our main results are broadly in line 
with our earlier findings in Table 7. 
Table 9 
 
Notes: Second sample split regression results using charter values (CV) as a threshold variable. The dependent variable RBUF 
represents banks' capital buffers. The explanatory charter value variable is Tobin’s q ratio (CVTBQ). All other variables are described 
in section 3.2.1 and the variables summary tables in Appendix B. The standard errors are reported in parentheses (White corrected for 
heteroskedasticity). Results correspond to trimming percentages of 15%. ** and *** indicate significance levels of five percent and 
one percent respectively.  
 
 
 
In table 9 we present our empirical results using       as our charter value threshold variable, and 
      as our explanatory variable of interest in connection with our second sample split. Beginning 
with the estimated coefficient for      , our results are consistent with earlier results noted for 
banks with charter values greater than the threshold level of 1.46.This in turn might be attributed to 
better accessibility of large banks beyond a certain charter level to new equity thereby reducing the 
need for them to manage large capital buffers, or alternatively, might be associated with the “too 
big to fail” paradigm as discussed earlier.  
It is important to reiterate that repeating the analysis on a sample consisting exclusively of Islamic 
commercial banks is not possible at this stage given the limited number of publicly listed Islamic 
commercial banks (only 25 are publicly listed).
35
 Having said that, based on the threshold value 
point estimate for       of .96, it is important to note that twenty Islamic banks have threshold 
values of more than .96, whist the remaining five Islamic banks have threshold values less than .96. 
On the other hand, based on the threshold value point estimates for       of 1.04 and for       of 
1.46, the threshold values of Islamic banks seem to be more or less equally distributed above and 
below the point estimates. And finally, in connection with our second sample split, it is important to 
note that seven Islamic banks have threshold values less than the       point estimate of 2.2 and 
five Islamic banks have threshold values more than the       point estimate of 2.2. These results 
                                                        
35 It is important to note that in jurisdictions such as Malaysia most Islamic banks are subsidiaries of conventional 
banks, and hence, the Islamic banking subsidiaries are not individually listed on the public exchanges. 
Linear model
OLS without threshold Regime 1 CV≤2.2 Regime 2 CV>2.2
Constant -8.534*** -10.392*** -3.971
(1.549) (1.854) (2.077)
CV TBQ -0.045 4.464 2.491
(1.138) (2.289) (1.373)
NPL -0.256** -0.363 -0.355**
(0.118) (0.176) (0.164)
GDPGR -1.564** -2.235*** 1.081
(0.607) (0.581) (1.02)
FINDEV 1.985*** 1.247** 3.975***
(0.512) (0.597) (0.769)
R-sq 0.529 0.585 0.685
Heteroskedasticity test (p -value) 0.064 - -
No. of observations 55 29 26
Threshold model 3b (charter values=CVPBV)
 
 
 
 
would in turn seem to suggest that the relationship between Islamic banks’ charter values and 
capital buffers are also non-linear in line with the theoretical predictions.  
And finally, we recognize the possibility for potential endogeneity between the charter value of the 
bank       and capital buffers         as suggested by theory. 
36
 The presence of an endogeneity 
problem would imply that the least squares (LS) estimation may yield biased and inconsistent 
coefficient estimates, hence, hypotheses tests can be seriously misleading. We therefore test for the 
potential endogeneity of the charter value by performing the Durban-Wu-Hausman test as 
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). On testing the endogeneity of our explanatory 
variables of interest, namely       and      , our test results reveal that both measures are 
exogenous.
37
 Our test results in turn indicate that the set of estimates obtained by least squares are 
consistent, and hence the use of instrumental variables is not required. 
5. Final remarks 
As a result of the increasing global recognition of Islamic banking as a viable alternative banking 
model, this study in particular aims to contribute to the understanding of how Islamic banks’ capital 
buffers behave in the face of unique risk exposures arising from the nature of their operations. It is 
expected this in turn would provide insight on the overall susceptibilities of Islamic banks to risks 
emanating from their operating environments, as well as their current risk management practices. In 
line with recent soundings for viable incentives that could moderate banks’ excessive risk taking 
behaviour, we also address whether the disciplining effect of Islamic banks' charter values on their 
risk-taking incentives (capital buffers) is a function of the size of the charter in line with theoretical 
predictions. Our results raise distinct policy implications in particular with regards to the regulation 
and supervision of Islamic banks going forward.  We also envisage our findings to further enhance 
the risk management capabilities of Islamic banks, and in that sense, contribute to the resilience and 
sustainability of the Islamic financial system going forward. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
36 Theoretical papers analyze capital and risk taking decisions where banks’ franchise values are endogenous (Elizalde 
and Repullo, 2007; Souarez, 1994). 
37 The statistic is 2.19 and its p-value is .14 for       and .16 and its p-value is .689 for      . 
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Table A.1
38
 
 
Full sample tests: Estimation method is the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step GMM difference estimator for panel data with lagged 
dependent variables. The dependent variable is RBUF, which represents the banks' capital buffers. All other variables are described 
in section 3.2.1 and the variables summary tables in Appendix B. We estimate regressions for 2005-2012 (annual frequency). We 
apply Sargan’s statistic of over-identifying restrictions to confirm the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error 
term. The null hypothesis of the serial correlation test is that the errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation. ***,** and * 
indicate significance levels of one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
38 We introduce time fixed effects (time dummies) to account for any cross sectional dependence in the data. In line 
with Nier and Baumann (2006) and Silaghi et. al (2014) we control for time fixed effects as part of our robustness 
checks exclusively in Table 5. Given the limitations associated with the relatively short time span covered in our panel 
data set, we do not include any time trend component. The introduction of time fixed effects represents however a 
tighter control (Nier and Baumann, 2006). Tests of joint significance are conducted but not reported. In line with the 
arbitrary rule of thumb suggested by Roodman (2009), the number of instruments doesn’t outnumber the individual 
units (number of groups) in the panel suggesting potential problems of instrument proliferation are not apparent. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RBUF t-1 0.357*** 0.281*** 0.336*** 0.35*** 0.353*** 0.356***
[0.069] [0.076] [0.063] [0.070] [0.070] [0.069]
ASSETSPR 2.844 2.03 2.361 2.650 2.831 2.801
[ 1.911] [1.953] [1.904] [1.920] [1.877] [1.911]
IBDUM x ASSETSPR 5.503** 5.984** 6.588** 4.996* 5.595** 5.623**
[2.672] [2.607] [2.696] [2.740] [2.667] [2.666]
EQTYFIN 0.757
[0.626]
DEPOSIT 0.108 0.039 0.121 0.100 0.105 0.102
[0.176] [0.177] [0.176] [0.177] [0.175] [0.176]
IBDUM x DEPOSIT 1.012** 1.213*** 1.009** 0.93** 1.031** 1.15***
[0 .429] [0.414] [0.419] [0.435] [0.424] [0.439]
ROE 0.204 0.186 0.199 0.219 0.211 0.198
[0.320] [0.322] [0.304] [0.315] [0.322] [0.320]
NPL -1.205** -1.225*** -1.195*** -1.197** -1.2*** -1.251***
[0.474] [0.472] [0.458] [0.485] [0.458] [0.459]
LOANSCD -0.216* -0.274** -0.170 -0.211 -0.21 -0.223*
[0.127] [0.127] [0.131] [0.129] [0.130] [0.127]
SIZE -0.118* -0.16** -0.138* -0.091 -0.113 -0.114
[0.070] [0.071] [0.071] [0.076] [0.072] [0.070]
IBDUM x SIZE -0.088
[0.103]
CR3 1.410* 0.874 -0.490 1.264* 1.459** 1.408*
[0.725] [0.770] [0.957] [0.731] [0.730] [0.723]
IBDUM x CR3 4.211***
[1.382]
FINDEV -0.923*** -1.002*** -1.035*** -0.902*** -0.917*** -0.922***
[0.203] [0.207] [0.211] [0.205] [0.204] [.202]
GDPGR -1.429*** -1.228*** -1.28*** -1.502*** -1.479*** -1.428***
[0.347] [0.361] [0.343] [0.347] [0.397] [0.346]
IBDUM x GDPGR 0.172
[0.727]
STATE x IBDUM x DEPOSIT -1.2**
[0.547]
No of obs 380 380 380 380 380 380
No of banks 128 128 128 128 128 128
Instruments 30 31 31 31 31 31
Sargan test 22.192 18.687 18.854 21.92 22.5 22.525
AR(1) test -3.514*** -2.943*** -3.518*** -3.466*** -3.480*** -3.480***
AR(2) test 1.053 0.993 1.028 1.094 1.051 1.025
All banks :Dependent variable RBUF
 
 
 
 
Table A.2
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Full sample tests: Estimation method is the Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system GMM estimator for panel data with lagged 
dependent variables. The dependent variable is RBUF, which represents the banks' capital buffers. All other variables are described 
in section 3.2.1 and the variables summary tables in Appendix B. We estimate regressions for 2005-2012 (annual frequency). We 
apply Sargan’s statistic of over-identifying restrictions to confirm the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error 
term. The null hypothesis of the serial correlation test is that the errors exhibit no second-order serial correlation. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance levels of one percent, five percent and ten percent respectively. 
 
 
                                                        
39 We introduce time fixed effects to account for any cross sectional dependence in the data. In line with Nier and 
Baumann (2006) and Silaghi et. al (2014) we control for time fixed effects as part of our robustness checks in Table 5. 
Given the limitations associated with the relatively short time span covered, we do not include any time trend 
component. The introduction of time fixed effects represents however a tighter control (Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
Tests of joint significance are conducted but not reported. In line with the arbitrary rule of thumb suggested by 
Roodman (2009), the number of instruments doesn’t outnumber the number of groups in the panel suggesting potential 
problems of instrument proliferation are not apparent. Our results also satisfy the requirements for the “steady state” 
assumption for the validity of instruments in system GMM to hold (Roodman, 2009). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RBUF t-1 0.499*** 0.518*** 0.454*** 0.444*** 0.499*** 0.498***
[0.050] [0.048] [0.049] [0.056] [0.050] [0.050]
ASSETSPR 3.528* 3.309* 3.37* 3.128 3.519* 3.504*
[ 1.963] [1.968] [1.930] [ 1.942] [1.945] [1.964]
IBDUM x ASSETSPR 2.101 3.531 1.741 3.761 2.036 2.004
[2.748] [2.633] [ 2.695] [2.709] [2.711] [2.734]
EQTYFIN -1.035**
[0.472]
DEPOSIT 0.282 0.199 0.229 0.108 0.275 0.279
[.188] [0.182] [0.185] [0.178] [0.188] [0.188]
IBDUM x DEPOSIT -0.263 0.002 -0.183 0.435 -0.245 -0.29
[0.369] [0.348] [0.421] [0.394] [0.370] [0.368]
ROE -0.133 -0.0731 -0.121 0.152 -0.148 -0.149
[.299] [0.309] [0.312] [0.308] [0.298] [0.297]
NPL -1.037* -1.007* -0.828 -0.842* -1.057* -1.049*
[0.564] [0.552] [0.555] [0.496] [0.557] [0.559]
LOANSCD -0.064 -0.142 -0.083 -0.140 -0.072 -0.064
[0.1405] [0.139] [0.140] [0.128] [0.142] [0.139]
SIZE 0.061 0.0491 0.051 0.053 0.061 0.057
[0.051] [0.051] [0.058] [0.050] [0.052] [0.052]
IBDUM x SIZE -0.138***
[0.053]
CR3 1.402** 1.668*** 1.619** 1.404** 1.396** 1.373**
[0.6167] [0.607] [0.757] [0.638] [0.617] [0.612]
IBDUM x CR3 -0.231
[1.010]
FINDEV -0.766*** -0.774*** -0.665*** -0.781*** -0.753*** -0.776***
[0.206] [0.200] [0.196] [0.203] [0.208] [.208]
GDPGR -1.837*** -1.902*** -1.793*** -1.851*** -1.958*** -1.825***
[0.342] [0.342] [0.338] [0.325] [0.382] [0.343]
IBDUM x GDPGR 0.291
[0.783]
STATE x IBDUM x DEPOSIT 0.104
[0.581]
No of obs 515 515 515 515 515 515
No of banks 132 132 132 132 132 132
Instruments 35 36 36 36 36 36
Sargan test 30.578* 29.53 31.798* 26.555 30.658* 30.668*
AR(1) test -4.101*** -4.202*** -3.966*** -3.735*** -4.1*** -4.107***
AR(2) test 1.247 1.048 1.242 1.189 1.253 1.256
All banks :Dependent variable RBUF
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Table B.1 
Summary	of	all	variables	table:	Summary	of	definitions,	descriptions	and	data	sources	for	all	variables	defined	in	sections	
3.2.1	and	3.3.1.		
 
 
 
 
Variable 
The market value to book value of capital.
Takes values between 0 and 14 with higher 
values indicating more supervisory power.
Takes values between 0 and 8 with higher 
values indicating greater market discipline.
Growth rate in real GDP and on a per 
capital basis
Level of non performing loans and loan loss 
provisions relative to total financings.
Total assets of the top three and four banks 
respectively relative to total banking assets in 
each country.
The composition and scoring of this index is a 
function of an assessment of seven indicators 
that gage the various aspects of financial 
development.Overall score for each country 
calculated on a 1 to 7 normalized scale.
The annual growth rate of real gross domestic 
product and the annual growth rate  of real per 
capita gross domestic product respectively.
The current market value of a firm's assets (the 
market value of its equity plus debt) divided by 
their current cost to a firm (the book value of 
assets).
Absolute spread between the average return 
on equity (ROE) and the average rate of return 
on depositors’ funds.
Level of unrestricted PSIAs relative to total 
liabilities for Islamic banks and similar tenured 
deposits to total liabilities for conventional 
banks. 
Bankscope database and individual 
audited financial statements
 Individual audited financial 
statements
Bankscope database
 Individual audited financial 
statements
RBUF
EQTYSPR
ASSETSPR
EQTYFIN
Fixed rate financing 
DEPOSIT
PLS based financing 
FIXEDRTFIN
Relative capital buffers
Asset spread measure
Equity spread measure
ROE
Amount of net income returned relative to 
total shareholder's equity.
NPL & LLP
Non performing loans and loan loss 
provisions
Level of fixed rate financing relative to total 
financing for Islamic banks.
LOANSCD Loans to customer deposits Level of loans relative to customers’ deposits.
SIZE Bank size effect Natural logarithm of total banks assets.
CR3 & CR4 Banking system concentration ratios
FINDEV Financial development index
GDPGR & 
GDPCAPGR
SPR Measure for supervisory power
CV TBQ Tobin's q ratio
CV PBV Price to book value
MDPM
Measure for market discipline and 
private monitoring
Bankscope database
Bankscope database
Bankscope database
Central bank websites
Annual financial development 
reports (World Economic Forum)
World Bank Regulation and 
Supervision database
World Bank Regulation and 
Supervision database
Definition Description Data source
IMF World Economic Outlook 
database
Bankscope database and stock 
exchanges websites
Bankscope database and stock 
exchanges websites
Level of PLS based financing relative to total 
financing for Islamic banks.
 Individual audited financial 
statements
 Individual audited financial 
statements
Return on equity Bankscope database
UPSIAs and similar tenured deposits for 
conventional banks 
Difference between the total capital ratio and 
the minimum capital requirement divided by 
the minimum capital requirement.
Absolute spread between the return on assets 
(ROA) (after considering all expenses but 
excluding profits paid to depositors) and the 
returns on depositors’ funds.
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2 
Summary of dummy variables table: Summary of definitions, descriptions and data sources for dummy variables defined in sections 
3.2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
STATA generated
STATA generated
STATA generated
STATA generated
STATA generated
The Association of South East Asian 
Nations region
Takes the value of 1 for countries in this region 
and 0 otherwise.
STATA generated
MENAT
ASEAN
SOUTHASIA
Middle East, North Africa and Turkey 
region
Takes the value of 1 for countries in this region 
and 0 otherwise.
The South Asian region
Takes the value of 1 for countries in this region 
and 0 otherwise.
EXPLICIT
Explicit deposit insurance dummy 
variable
Takes the value of 1 for countries with explicit 
deposit insurance systems and 0 otherwise.
STATE State bank dummy variable
Takes the value of 1 for state owned banks and 
0 otherwise.
IBDUM Islamic bank dummy variable
Takes the value of 1 for Islamic banks and 0 
otherwise.
PUBLIC Publicly listed bank dummy variable
Takes the value of 1 for publicly listed banks 
and 0 otherwise.
CRISIS 2008 crisis dummy variable
Takes the value of 1 for the 2008 financial crisis 
period and 0 otherwise.
STATA generated
STATA generated
Definition Description Data source
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